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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
This is the Appeal of Plaintiff Marc Smith, "Smith", of
the orders of the Sixth Judicial District Court on three
motions

for summary judgment of Defendants Grand Canyon

Expeditions Company, UGCE"; Martin Mathis, "Mathis"; Michael
Denoyer, "Denoyer"; and Donald Saunders, uSaunders", sometimes
collectively

referred

to as

u

combined

Appellees".

The

Defendant Ronald R. Smith has been dismissed from this suit
and is not a part of this Appeal.
Since the filing of this suit, Appellee Donald Saunders
has died. His estate has been notified and become substituted
as a party, pursuant to Utah R.Civ. P. 25(a) and by order of
the court below dated March 13, 2001, See Addendum 2028-2029.
Otherwise, the caption of this case on appeal contains the
names of all parties.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(j).

The Supreme

Court granted the parties' Joint Petition for Permission to
Appeal Interlocutory Order, by order dated September 26, 2 001,
see

Supplemental Addendum 2 058-2 057, and shall as well hear

issues determined by the Sixth Judicial District Court to be
final under Utah R.Civ. P. 54(b), by order dated August 23,
2001.

See Addendum, 2041-2040.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

This appeal raises the following issues:
1.

Whether

the

court

below

erred

in

granting

the

combined Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment on Smith's
breach of contract and breach of covenant of good faith and
fair dealing claims arising from the termination of Smith's
employment with GCE?

Smith alleged GCE and the individual

Appellees breached GCE's employment agreement with him and the
inherent

covenant

of

good

faith

terminating him without cause.

and

fair

dealing

by

The court concluded that,

while material issues of fact existed as to implied terms and
C:\MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbrief.fm.wpd
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conditions of employment and whether Smith had overcome the
presumption of at will employment, the termination documents
executed by the parties at Smith's separation constituted an
accord, effectively waiving and releasing all Appellees from
any claim Smith may have had arising from his employment
agreement with Grand Canyon Expedition Company.
2.

Whether

the

court

below

erred

in granting

the

combined Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment on Smith's
claim that the combined Appellees breached a stock buy-sell
agreement

between

the parties, along

with

the

inherent

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, by reason of their
failure to adjust historic accounting practices when they
calculated the net book value at the time of their forced buy
out of Smith?

Smith claims that GCE's historic accounting of

the value of its assets, acquisitions and income were kept
artificially

low for tax purposes

and

should have been

adjusted at the time of the combined Appellees' forced buy out
of Smith to accurately reflect the real net book value of GCE
as of the date of the buy out.

The court reasoned, in

essence, that there were not facts sufficient to support a
C:\MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbrief.fm.wpd
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conclusion that the accounting practices employed at Smith's
departure were influenced by his forced exit and therefore the
accord reached between the parties upon Smith's departure bars
any claim arising from the historic accounting practices.
3.

Whether

the

court below

combined Appellees' Motion

for

erred

Summary

in granting
Judgment

the

on the

question of whether or not Smith is entitled to punitive
damages?
4.

Whether

the

court below

erred

in granting

the

combined Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment on Smith's
claim for attorneys' fees as consequential damages?
5.

Whether the court below erred in denying Smith's

motion for leave to amend its complaint to add a claim for
unjust enrichment?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court's rulings of Smith's motions for summary
judgment will be reviewed under the same standard as that
applied by the trial court. In other words, the appellate
court will view the facts and all reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party
C:\MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbrief.fin.wpd
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opposing the motion. The trial court's conclusions of law are
E.g.

reviewed for correctness.
Corp.

v. Campbell,

Neiderhauser

Bldrs.

& Dev.

824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Issues of contractual interpretation are also reviewed for
correctness,
Aquagen

affording

Int'l,

Inc.

v.

the district
Calrae

1998) [citations omitted].

Trust,

court

no deference.

972 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah

The reviewing court may affirm on

any ground available to the trial court regardless of whether
it was relied upon in reaching the decision from which an
appeal is sought. Higgins
241 (Utah 1993).

v. Salt

Lake County,

855 P.2d 231,

The trial court's denial of Smith's motion

for leave to amend will be reviewed on an abuse of discretion
standard.

E.g.

Harper

v.

Summit

County,

963 P. 2d 768, 779

(Utah Ct. App. 1998).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASES
1.

Utah law articulating the elements and appropriate

analysis in the area of accord and satisfaction is articulated
in Marton

Estate
Mountain

Remodeling

Landscaping
States
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v.

and

Telephone

Jensen,

706 P.2d

Snow Removal
and Telegraph
4

607

(Utah 1985);

Specialists,
Co.,

Inc.

v.

844 P.2d 322,

(Utah 1992) and revisited in ProMax Dev.

Corp.

v. Raile,

998

P.2d 254 (Utah 2000).
2.

Utah law of waiver as it relates to Appellant's

execution

of

documents

surround

the

termination

employment and stock buyout is addressed in Soters,
Deseret

Federal

Savings

and Loan

Assn.,

of

his

Inc.

v.

857 P.2d 935 (Utah

1993) .
3.

Utah law generally as it relates to breach of an

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as articulated
in St. Benedict's

Development

Co. v. St.

Benedict's

Hosp.,

811

P. 2d 194 (Utah 1991) and its progeny. There do not appear to
be any Utah Cases specifically addressing breach of such a
covenant inherent in a stock buy-sell agreement.
4.

Utah law regarding recovery of punitive damages for

claims predicated on breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing and the opportunity to plead and prove
punitive damages is included in CooJc Associates,
Warnick,
Co. v.

Inc.

v.

664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983); St. Benedict's Development
St.

Benedict's

C \MyFiles\SMITH\Appeilantbnef fin wpd

Hosp.,

811 P.2d 199 (Utah 1991); Utah

5

R.Civ. P. 54(c) (1); Behrens

v. Raleigh

Hills

Hosp.,

Inc.,

675

P.2d 1175 (Utah 1983).
5.

Utah law as it relates to recovery of attorney's fees

as consequential damages, including recovery of such fees for
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an
employment agreement and stock buy-sell agreement is addressed
in Canyon

Country

Collier

v.

Heinz,

v.

of

Utah,

Bank
5.

Store

v.

Bracey,

781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989);

827 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1992); and,

Heslop

839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992).

The law of Utah as it relates to unjust enrichment,

including whether unjust enrichment is an appropriate remedy
is found in E.g.
Inc.,

American

Towers

Owners'

Ass'n

v.

CCI

Mech.,

930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, Marc Smith, had made his life's career running

river rafting trips through the Grand Canyon.

He worked full

time for Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. a corporation owned by
his older brother, Ronald R. Smith, beginning in about 1968,
for 18 years as a river guide, chief river guide and manager.
In 198 6, when Ronald R. Smith sold Grand Canyon Expeditions,

C \MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbnef fin wpd
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Inc.

to a group of

individuals

led by Appellee Donald

Saunders, Smith became an owner, director and officer, along
with Denoyer, Mathis, Saunders and, his brother Ron, of the
newly incorporated company known as Grand Canyon Expeditions
Company, UGCE".
Smith's two working partners, Denoyer, and Mathis, had
previously worked together at a competitor of Grand Canyon
Expeditions, Inc., White Water River Expeditions. Denoyer was
a manager for White Water River Expeditions and Mathis was a
seasonal employee, working as a boatman for White Water
running a couple river trips a year. Denoyer and Mathis were
both involved from the beginning with Saunders, who financed
the purchase of Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. from Ron Smith,
and the organization of GCE.

Saunders wanted to retain both

the owner of Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. and Smith, who had
been running the warehouse, equipment and crew for Grand
Canyon Expeditions, Inc., to assure that the new Corporation,
GCE, would continue to operate as it had been until then.
However, although Denoyer and Mathis were happy with their

C:\MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbrief.fin.wpd
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positions in the new company, they were not happy that they
were being forced to work with a "third" partner.
As part of the acquisition, Smith, Denoyer and Mathis
were each required to sign an employment agreement, promissory
notes and a stock agreement dated as of November 29, 1986.
These agreements, along with conversations at the time of the
organization

of

the

purchasing

entity,

and

continuing

thereafter in meetings and exchanges among the investors,
along with the parties' course of dealing with each other,
comprehend the business relationship between the parties. The
employment agreement provided for an initial term of one year.
The initial promissory note called for repayment in January of
1992.

The buy-sell agreement provided the mechanism for the

acquisition of an outgoing party's stock in the corporation
with an accelerated schedule to be used in the calculation of
the outgoing shareholders purchase price.

Pursuant to the

buy-sell agreement, Smith became obligated upon termination of
his employment at GCE, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to
sell to GCE, and GCE was obligated to buy from Smith, all of
his shares of stock in GCE.

C:\MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbricf.fin.wpd

The price for the shares was to

O

be based upon a percentage of net book value of such shares as
determined in the sole and conclusive discretion of GCE's
accountant.

Under the agreement, the buyout price escalated

over time from 100 percent to 140 percent of net book value.
Smith brought his experience, knowledge and expertise to
GCE.

He shared that experience, knowledge and expertise with

his partners Denoyer and Mathis.

In 1991, GCE acquired a

competing river running company known as Whitewater/Sobek.
With this acquisition the officers of GCE increased their
shares of stock; however, the acquisition also greatly diluted
the stock value.

In conjunction with the Whitewater/Sobek

acquisition and the increase of percentage ownership in the
company, the parties executed a second promissory note payable
December 1998.
In July 1992, almost six years into the enterprise, after
Denoyer

and Mathis had had the opportunity

to learn the

intricacies of running and managing a river running operation,
Denoyer, the president of the company, fired Smith, which
termination contractually obligated Smith to sell his shares
in GCE back to the Corporation.

C \MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbnef fin wpd
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He was given no reason or

explanation for his termination.

He was given no notice,

either formal or otherwise; nor was any other shareholder,
officer, or director of GCE provided with written notice of
the

impending unilateral

decision, or any opportunity

to

inquire or investigate the matter, prior to ousting Smith,
their partner and co-owner from his position with GCE.

The

value of the stock was substantially lower than it had been in
the past when Smith was terminated from GCE. The reasons for
and basis of Smith's termination and subsequent liquidation of
his stock position in GCE are the subject of his breach of
contract and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing

claims.

The

claims

arise

from

his

employment

agreement with GCE as well as from his buy-sell agreement with
combined Appellees.
Upon his departure, Smith and GCE negotiated termination
documents whereby Smith resigned his position as director and
officer and acknowledged the calculation of his buy out.
Smith

subsequently

discovered

that,

due

to

historic

accounting practices, the calculation of the net book value of
his stock as of July 1992, which was performed in the sole and

C \MyFiles\SMITH\AppelIantbnef fin wpd
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conclusive discretion of GCE, did not accurately and fairly
reflect the real net book value of the corporation at that
time

and

realized

that

he

had

been

deprived

substantial benefit of his bargain with Appellees.

of

that

This suit

based on his wrongful termination and loss of benefit of his
bargain under the buy-sell agreement followed.
Well

after

the

suit was

filed

and

the parties

were

engaged in substantial discovery and motions, Smith became
aware that GCE received a refund of an Arizona state amusement
tax in the amount of $907,916.94 for taxes assessed Grand
Canyon from 1986 through 1992.

On March 31, 1999, Smith

motioned the court for leave to amend its complaint to add a
claim for unjust enrichment based on the amusement tax refund
of taxes collected and paid to the state of Arizona during the
time he owned a percentage of GCE.

In its March 20, 2000

Memorandum Decision, the court below elected to avoid the
quagmire of getting into an unjust enrichment analysis and
determined instead to allow Smith to pursue his claim for a
portion of the Arizona amusement tax refund under his theory

C \MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbnef fin wpd
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of breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The

court below denied Smith's motion for leave to amend.
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES BELOW
On about June 29, 1998, Smith filed a second amended
complaint asserting two causes of action, the first for breach
of contract and the second for breach of covenant of good
faith and fair dealing against all of the Appellees.

Smith's

breach of contract and covenant of good faith and fair dealing
claims
parties

are based
under

on the performances

the

subject

employment

stockholders buy-sell agreement.
On March

and

conduct

agreement

of

the

and

the

See Addendum 181-213.

31, 1999, Smith moved

to amend

his

second

amended complaint to add a claim for unjust enrichment based
on the receipt by GCE of the Arizona amusement tax refund.
All Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment on about
October 30, 1998, a second motion for summary judgment on
March 22, 1999 and a third motion for summary judgment on
October 5, 2000.

By memorandum decisions dated January 15,

1999, Addendum 807-815; March 20, 2000, Addendum 1713-1721;
and January 27, 2001, Addendum 2011-2022; and Order dated July

C \MyFiies\SMITH\Appellantbnef fin wpd
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31, 2001, Addendum 2030-2033, the court granted Appellees'
motion for summary judgment on Smith's breach of contract and
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims as it relates
to Smith's employment, GCE's historic accounting practices and
failure to make adjustment at time of Smith's buy out, but
denied the combined Appellees' motion as to Smith's claim for
breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing as it
relates to the Arizona amusement tax refund question. As the
court concluded that the issue related to Smith's entitlement
to a portion of the Arizona tax refund question fell within
the ambit of his covenant of good faith and fair dealing
claim, it denied his motion for leave to amend his complaint
to add the unjust enrichment claim.
The

parties

jointly

petitioned

See Addendum 1713-1721.
the

Supreme

Court

for

permission to appeal the trial court's July 31, 2 001 order on
the Appellees' motions for summary judgment,

Smith's motion

for leave to amend the complaint, and other rulings which
Appellees will raise on cross appeal.

That petition was

granted by order dated September 26, 2001, see
Addendum 2058-2057.
C \MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbnef fin wpd

Supplemental

The parties also jointly petitioned the
13

trial court pursuant to Utah R.Civ. P. 54(b) for certification
of the trial court's prior order regarding Smith's breach
claims

as

they

arose

from

his

allegations

of

wrongful

termination and otherwise out of the employment relationship.
See Addendum 2039-2034.

That order was granted by the trial

court on September 7, 2 0 01.

See Addendum 2 041-2040.

SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT
The

trial

termination

court's

claim

dismissal

of

against Appellees was

Smith's

wrongful

in error.

The

documents, discussions and course of dealings between the
parties over the six years of the enterprise evidence a clear
intention of an implied term of the employment contract that
Smith could not be terminated without cause. The record shows
that Smith was not an at-will employee, but a corporate
officer,

a

stock

owner, and

active

in the day

to day

operations of the business, and that all parties intended this
to be a long term business commitment.

Appellees needed to

show cause in order to fire Smith, which they failed to do.
The record shows a material dispute of fact surrounding the
terms

of

Smith's

C \MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbnef fin wpd
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that

should

have

overcome

Appellees' motions for summary judgment.

The court below

recognized these issues of fact but then retreated to the
documents executed in conjunction with Smith's termination and
buy out to conclude that he had reached an accord, effectively
waiving and releasing Appellees from all such claims.
The trial court erred in dismissing Smith's claim based
on Appellees' breach of contract and their covenant of good
faith and fair dealing as it related to the calculation of
GCE's net book value at the time of Appellees' buyout of
Smith.

Smith

argued

that

the

Appellees

breached

their

contractual obligations and covenant of good faith and fair
dealing by relying on historic corporate accounting procedures
used

for

tax

purposes,

the

net

effect

of

which

was

to

establish a net book value artificially low at the time of his
forced buy-out and substantially lower than the real net book
value of the business.

This calculus included inappropriate

amortization of several large assets, as well as the booking
of, the depreciation of, and the general accounting treatment
of

the

purchased

Whitewater/Sobek.
C \MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbnef fin wpd

assets

of

the

acquired

company

As issues of material fact exist as to the
1 5

nature of the historic accounting methods and the proper
calculation

of

inappropriate.

"net

book

value",

summary

judgment

was

The court below avoided any analysis of the

facts but simply relied, in its ruling on Appellees' third
summary judgment motion, on its accord analysis in its ruling
on Appellees' first motion and dismissed Smith's claim.
The trial court's dismissal of Smith's claim for punitive
damages and attorneys' fees was premature and in error.
Punitive damages are an appropriate remedy if Smith can
establish

at

trial

evidence

of

intentional

conduct,

willfulness, malice or reckless disregard of rights on the
part of the Appellees, by reason of conduct arising to the
level of an independent tort.

In this case, Appellees'

intentionally, willfully or recklessly sought out to learn the
operation of the business and then to terminate Smith; and
then willfully, intentionally and recklessly deprived Smith of
the real value of his interest in GCE when he was forced to
sell his stock for a price which was based on an artificially
low valuation of GCE.

Smith was never given the chance to

establish the elements of these torts before the trier of
C \MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbnef fin wpd
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fact, and dismissal by summary judgment was premature and in
error.
Further, attorney's fees are recoverable for a breach of
good faith and fair dealing under a reasonable extension of
existing Utah case law, and the trial court's dismissal of
Smith's claim was premature and in error.
Finally, the court abused its discretion in denying
Smith's motion for leave to amend his complaint to add a claim
for unjust enrichment. The court below simply dispensed with
the motion without evaluating the allegations of plaintiff's
complaint and the legal theories by concluding that any
recovery of the Arizona amusement tax refund fits within
Smith's theory of breach of the covenant of good and fair
dealing under the stock buy-sell agreement.

In so doing, the

court deprived Smith of the alternative equitable theory of
unjust enrichment should the court at trial conclude that
Smith's claim falls without the ambit of his contract with
Appellees.
ARGUMENT

C \MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbnef fin wpd
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I.

SMITH'S TERMINATION FROM GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS' EMPLOY
AND AS AN OFFICER, DIRECTOR AND CO-OWNER OF THE COMPANY
WAS WRONGFUL AND CONSTITUTED A BREACH OF CONTRACT AND OF
APPELLEES' OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.
A.

No accord was reached between Smith and Appellees at
the termination of Smith's participation in GCE
Enterprise nor were any potential claims waived or
released.

The court below erred in granting summary judgment on
Smith's employment-related

claims.

It dispensed with all

issues and potential issues related to Smith's employment with
GCE and his participation

in the GCE enterprise with the

individual Appellees by concluding that an accord was reached
between the parties, "between July 15 and July 25, 1992 as
reflected

in the

termination

documents."

See the

Trial

Court's January 15, 1999 Memorandum Decision at p. 6, included
as Addendum 807-815.

To this end, the court reasoned

Plaintiff's resignation is short and simple
and
is
signed
and notarized.
The
accompanying agreement provides for the
purchase of Plaintiff's stock at 140
percent of value, consistent with the BuySell Agreement, and affords him two other
forms of relief to which he does not appear
to have been previously entitled.
These
two benefits are respectively a severance
payment equivalent to one year's salary and
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the second, a relaxation
competition covenant.

of

a

non-

Under paragraph 6 of the termination
agreement, the severance pay was "In
addition to the payments provided above
[for stock purchases] , and in lieu of any
other amounts or benefits which may be due
from the corporation as provided in the
Employment Agreement or otherwise . . ."
This is strong language.
Id.

The court continues to point out the facts it considered

important as a basis of its "accord" holding.

Those were that

it was Smith who suggested the possibility of a severance
payment

and Saunders agreed; that Smith stopped

short of

claiming fraud in the inducement of his signature on the
severance payments; that Smith was aware of the existence of
a non-compete obligation; that GCE agreed to waive the right
to enforce its non-competition agreement; and, that Smith
accepted payments contemporaneously as well as those made
after execution of the agreements.

See Addendum 807-815.

Under Utah law, " [a]n accord and satisfaction arises when
the parties to a contract agree that a different performance,
to be made

in substitution of the performance

originally

agreed upon, will discharge the obligation created under the
C:\MyFiles\SMITH\AppeIlantbrief.fin.wpd
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original agreement."

ProMax

Dev.

Corp.

v.

254, 259 (Utah 2000) (citations omitted).

Raile,

998 P. 2d

To prevail on the

claim of the existence of an accord, the moving party must
show

u

(l) an unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute over

the amount due; (2) the payment offered as full settlement of
the entire dispute; and, (3) an acceptance of the payment as
full settlement of the dispute."
v.

Jensen,

Id.

citing

Marton

Remodeling

706 P.2d 607, 609-10 (Utah 1985).

As a preliminary matter, accord of satisfaction is an
affirmative defense under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (c)
which must be raised in an answer or it is waived.

generally

Valley

Bank & Trust

Co. v.

Wilkin,

See

668 P. 2d 493

(Utah 1983) . As accord and satisfaction has not been included
as an affirmative defense in this action, nor ever squarely
raised in a motion or argument in support of summary judgment,
the court further erred in injecting its accord analysis in
dismissing Smith's employment and buy-sell agreement claims.

The facts before the court below do not support a finding
that an unliquidated claim or bona fide dispute over an amount
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existed at the time the so-called ''termination documents" were
executed.

Between July 15 and July 25, 1992, after Smith was

terminated and before he executed the "termination documents",
he surely was aware that there may be concerns related to the
termination of his employment.

However, at that time he had

no reason to believe, nor was any evidence produced that Smith
had the documents or knowledge sufficient to evaluate GCE's
unilateral and conclusive determination of the net book value
of GCE in calculating what it was to pay under its forced buyout of Smith's shares. Further, no evidence was produced, nor
does any exist that a dispute as to the buy-out amount existed
at that point. The court was silent in the application of any
particular facts to the law of accord in evaluating the three
required elements of Marton.

Id.

As no real unliquidated

claim for a bona fide dispute as to GCE's calculation of the
buy out amount was known at the time of the execution of the
"termination documents" to exist, Appellees failed in showing
the first element of their claim of accord.
Second, even if Smith fully appreciated his employment
and buy-sell agreement claims at the time of his precipitous

C:\MyFiles\SMITH\AppclIanlbnef.fin.wpd

21

termination from employment and resulting forced buy out of
his position in the GCE enterprise, the evidence presented in
support of Appellees' motions for summary judgment does not
support its finding that the payments made to Smith by GCE
were

final

or offered,

accepted,

and agreed

upon by

the

parties as full resolution and satisfaction of the disputed
See ProMax at 260.

claim.
The

"termination documents" referred

to by the court

below consist of a document styled "Agreement" dated July 25,
1992 and a second document styled "Resignation" dated July 25,
1992.

See Addendum 1498-1495 and 217.

Agreement

sets

forth all of

The January 25, 1992

the obligations

of

follows:
Smith hereby sells, assigns and transfers
all of his right, title and interest in and
to the Shares owned by him for a total
purchase price of One Hundred Eighty Six
Thousand Thirty Nine and 37/100 Dollars.
($186,039.37). The purchase price has been
determined in accordance with the terms of
the Buy-Sell Agreement based upon One
Hundred
Forty Percent
(14 0%) of the
Corporation's net book value as of June 30,
1992.
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Smith

as

Upon receipt of the above check, Smith
shall endorse it to Donald A. Saunders
which shall constitute payment in full of
all amounts owed by Smith to Donald A.
Saunders . . .
Said note shall be
canceled.

Smith shall resign as an officer and
employee of the Corporation effective July
15, 1992 and shall execute a resignation
letter. . .

Deliver Certificate No. 4 for 4,250 shares
. and Certificate No. 9 for 2,348
shares of Corporation stock . . . endorsed
on the back by Marc Smith.

Marc Smith shall not disclose confidential
information regarding the business of the
Corporation acquired during his employment
including but not limited to . . .
Smith represents and warrants that there
are no liens or other encumbrances against
any of the Corporation stock certificates
owned by him except for the lien in favor
of Donald A. Saunders . . . .
See Addendum 14 98-14 95.

There is no other language in the

Contract obligating Smith to do anything.

Nor is there any

language of an expression of GCE's intention that the payments
C:\MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbrief.fin.wpd
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made under that agreement are intended to constitute payment
in full of a disputed claim or unliquidated amount.

In cases

where the courts have recognized a valid accord, they rely on
language like that found on a check which states that the
payment constitutes "full settlement, payment in full", see
Dishinger

v.

Potter,

2001 WL 726259 *5

(Utah App.

2001),

Supplemental Addendum 2069-2059; or, a letter written and
forwarded with payment which states
Based on the above identified billing
descrepancies [sic] we have enclosed a
check for $8,613, which is payment in full
for satisfaction of contracted services.
If you are not willing to accept that sum,
$8,613 in full satisfaction of the sums due
DO NOT negotiate the check, for upon your
negotiation of that check, we will treat
the matter as fully paid.

See Estate
Mountain
324-325

Landscape
States

and Snow Removal

Telephone

(Utah 1992).

and Telegraph

Specialists,
Co.,

Inc.

v.

844 P.2d 322,

While the court may look beyond the

express contract terms in determining the intention of the
party making payment, the evidence presented to the trial
court in this case was merely the contract language along with
the parties' respective interpretations of the negotiation of

C:\MyFiles\SMITH\Appeilantbrief.fm.wpd

24

the severance payment and waiver of the covenant not to
compete. See Addendum 807-815. The evidence presented to the
trial court in the course of the motions for summary judgment
is an inadequate manifestation on the part of GCE and the
individual Appellees that the payments made as outlined in the
July 25, 1992 Agreement were intended as a full compromise of
disputed claims or unliquidated amounts.

The evidence does

not support the conclusion that Smith accepted payments as a
discharge of his original agreement with Appellees.
Nor is the language of the July 25, 1992 Agreement and
Resignation adequate to provide as a matter of law a waiver or
release of any claims that Smith may have had at the time.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right.
857

Soters,

P.2d

Intermountain

1991).

Inc.

935,

v. Deseret

939-940

Healthcare,

Federal

(Utah
Inc.,

Savings

1993);
808 P.2d

& Loan

citing

Assn.,

Reese

1069, 1073

Proving waiver requires three elements:

v.
(Utah

M l ) an

existing right, benefit or advantage; (2) knowledge of its
existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish that right."
Id.

Any waiver "must be distinctly made, although it may be
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express or implied."

Id.

citing Phoenix,

P.2d 308, 311 (Utah 1936).
Phoenix

Inc.

v.

Heath,

61

The court's reiteration of the

statement was to insure "that waiver would not be

found from any particular set of facts unless it was clearly
intended."

Soters,

Inc.

at 940.

Whether or not a party has
Olympus

waived a right is a highly fact-dependent question.
Hills

Shopping

Centers,
Barnes

Inc.,
v.

Center,

Ltd.

v.

Smiths

889 P.2d 445, 461

Food

King

and

(Utah App. 1994),

Drug
citing

Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah App. 1988) .

The termination documents referred to by the court in its
Memorandum
u

Decision

include

a

document

simply

styled

Agreement" executed by Smith and GCE by Denoyer on July 25,

1992, and a second document styled "Resignation" signed July
25,

1992.

Addendum
documents

Both
at pages
contain

of

those

documents

1498-1495
language

and

are

217.

manifesting

included
Neither

in the

of

a distinctly

those
made

waiver by Smith of any rights, much less the description of an
existing right, benefit or advantage, an acknowledgment by
Smith of its existence and an expression of his intention to
relinquish those rights.
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Soter

^

at 940.

First, as cited

above, tl: le

Agreement" :i s perhaps best characterized as a

statement of all of the terms of Smith's separation from GCE's
employ and enterprise,
merely

acknowledges

The second document, "Resignation"
Siniti 1/ s

resignation

as

the

Vice

President/Director of Grand Canyon Expeditions Company.

See

Addendum

the

217.

In fact, the Appellees, who prepared

"Agreement , apparently knew what was required to articulate
a waiver.

In paragraph

9 on page

3 of

the

"Agreement"

Appellees state "[t]he corporation hereby waives any right to
enforce the provisions of the covenant not to compete set out
in

paragraph

II.2

'Non-Competition'

of

the

Employment

Agreement executed by Smith on November 29, 1986 in favor of
the corporation

. . . ."

See Addendum 331-324.

No such

language exists in either agreement distinctly manifesting
Smith's waiver of any claims arising from his employment by
GCE, or of any nature.

The trial court's dismissal of Smith's

claims based on the "termination documents" was therefore in
error.
xssues of Material fact exist whether Appellees'
termination and buy-out of Smith constituted a
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breach of contract and covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
The

trial

court

in

its

January

15,

1999

Memorandum

Decision recognized, in evaluating whether or not an issue of
material fact existed regarding Smith's employment status,
that u . . . the full airing of the evidence may establish that
the relationship evolved into something which contemplated
greater job security and permanency."

See Addendum 815-807.

In its ruling below, the court in addressing the Appellees'
argument that Smith had not met his burden under Berube
Fashion

Centre

Ltd.,

Ill

P.2d

1033

(Utah

1989),

v.
of

establishing sufficient indicia of an implied in fact promise,
concluded

that

"[t]he

facts

in this

case

have

not

been

developed sufficiently for the Court to conclude as a matter
of law that Plaintiff could not meet this burden."

Finally,

the trial court acknowledged that issues of material fact
existed regarding whether or not the Appellees had cause to
terminate Smith in July 1992.

See Addendum 815-807.

The evidence below did not show sufficient facts that an
accord was reached between the parties, or that Smith waived

C:\MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbrief.finwpd

28

and released any of the claims he 1 lad as of July 25, 1992.
Since, as the court below noted, issues of fact exd st as t :
whether

oi: not

agreement:

cause

was

terminate

required

Smith,

under

whether

the

cause

employment
existed

to

terminate Smith in July of 1992, the o:i :der • :>f the coin : t: be] o ,
dismissing

Smith's

claims

under

his

employment

agreement

should be reversed and the case remanded for trial.
II.

APPELLEES BREACHED THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING WHEN IT MISCALCULATED THE NET
BOOK VALUE.
A.

No accord was reached of Smith's claims related
GCE's net book value calculation

The

court

below

iiI its

January

26,

2001

tn

Memorandum

Decision on the Appellees' third motion for summary judgment,
final!

:ispensed with Smith's claim

'»f hi each arising from

historic accounting practices by lumping it along with Smith's
employment claim, and concluded that any claim under the stock
buy-sell

agreement

related

to

the historic

barred by the accord reached July 25, 1992.
2022-2011.

calculation
See

is

Addendum

For the reasons set forth in Section I.A. above of

this brief, no accord was reached nor claim waived relating to
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the historic accounting and failure to make that correction at
the time of GCE and the individual Appellees' buy out of Smith
in July 1992. At the very least, a question of fact exists as
to whether or not an accord was reached or claim waived and
Smith respectfully therefore requests that this matter be
remanded to the trial court so that these matters can be
considered by the jury.
B.

GCE's failure to adjust its historic accounting
breached its covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.

Utah law governing the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is consistent with the Restatement

(Second) of

Contracts:
Good faith performance or enforcement of a
contract emphasizes faithfulness to an
agreed common purpose and consistency with
the justified expectations of the other
party; it excludes a variety of types of
conduct characterized as involving "bad
faith" because they violate community
standards
of
decency,
fairness
or
reasonableness.
RESTATEMENT

Olympus
Ctrs.,

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,

Hills
Inc.,

Shopping

Ctr. ,

§ 205 cmt.a (1979).

Ltd.

v.

Smith's

Food

See

also

& Drug

889 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 205 cmt. a (1979)), cert.
denied,

899 P 2d 1231 (Utah 1995).

The covenant is a necessary part of most, if not all,
contracts in Utah.
P. 2d 104] ,

See Andalex

Resources,

Inc.

\ r. Myers,

871

047 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) . Whether there has been

compliance with the covenant or duty depends upon the agreed
common purpose and justified expectations of the parties,
which is necessarily determined by the contract language, the
conduct of the parties, and the course of dealings between
them.

See St. Benedict's

Dev.

811 P. 2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991) .

Co,
u

\r, St, Benedict's

Hosp. ,

[G] ood faith and fair dealing

are fact sensitive concepts, and whether there has been a
breach of good faith and fair dealing is a factual issue,
generally inappropriate for decision as a matter of law,""
P.2d 285, 291
First

Nat'l

(Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Bank,

Accord

Cook

v.

883
Zions

919 P.2d 56, 60 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

To prevail on a claim of breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, a litigant need not show
evidence, or in this case, Smith had no requirement of raising
a genuine factual dispute, that the breaching party acted
C:\MyFiIes\SMITH\Appellantbrief.fin.wpd
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unreasonable or in bad faith.

Nor does a litigant have to

show that the discretion afforded under a contract to one
entity over the other was exercised unreasonably or in bad
faith.

The Utah Supreme Court has determined

that the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires parties,
particularly those vested with discretion over the other under
terms of a contract, to exercise that discretion reasonably
and in good faith.

See

Cook v.

Zions

P. 2d 56, 60 (Utah 1996) , citing Olympus
v.

Smiths

Food and Drug

App. 1994).

Centers,

First
Hills

Nat'l

Bank,

Shopping-

919
Center

889 P. 2d 44 5, 450 (Utah Ct.

This distinction, though subtle is significant.

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that the
party exercising discretion under a contract do so "for any
purpose-including ordinary business purposes-reasonably within
the contemplation of the parties.'' Olympus Hills
Olympus

Hills

at 451. The

court continues, " [a] contract thus would be

breached by a failure to perform in good faith if a party uses
its discretion for a reason outside the contemplated range-a
reason beyond the risks assumed by the party claiming a
breach."

Id.

citing
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RESTATEMENT [2D] OF CONTRACTS,

3 **

§ 20 5 cmt.a

(1979).

("[gjouci

faith

performance

of enforcement

of a

contract empha sizes faithfulness t o ai 1 agi e e d c ommon pui :po s e
and consistency with

justified

expectations

of the other

party").
C.

Qaicu]_atiori

o f t hie-! Mi'111!1 Ri. k "l| «:i 1 1:11 e •

In exercising the discretion to fire Smith and to buy
back his stock under the November 29, 1986 Buy Sell Agreement,
GCE and the individual

Appellees abused the J r discretion.

Contrary to their obligation to exercise their discretion in
favor of preserving the common purpose of maximizing value in
a business
undervalued

in which they all owned
GCE

by relying

stock

11 I• E ]r purpose 1 y

on its historic

accounting

practices used for tax purposes in order to deprive Smith of
his legitimate share of the value of h,i s stock.
The

Buy Sell

discretion

in

Agreement

determining

grants

GCE the "conclusive"

the net book

value

of the

corporation for purposes of determining the purchase price,
limited only by generally accepted accounting principles. See
Addendum 292.

The sale of a shareholder's stock to GCE is

mandated upon the termination of employment
C:\MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbrief.fln.wpd

3 3

-tee 'Addendum 2 93

*fi 1 and 29lU

4.

As Smith's stock represents his entire

participation in the GCE enterprise, his expectation that GCE
and

the

other

Agreement

not

participating
take

any

Appellees

action

which

in
might

the

Buy

Sell

artificially

decrease the net book value is reasonable and justified.
From its inception, GCE, through the auspices of its
officers and directors and its accountant Mr. Willis, employed
an accounting mechanism, the design of which was apparently to
keep its net book value artificially low for tax purposes.
See Addendum 1554:7-21. This commenced with the booking of $1
million of the original

$2,147 million purchase price as

payment for the covenant not to compete of Ron Smith, and then
by amortizing the covenant not to compete at $250,000 per year
over the first four years of the existence of the corporation.
See Derk Rasmussen's Affidavit, Addendum 1009 and 1007. GCE,
from its inception, failed to recognize any value

in the

concession contracts purchased from Ron Smith in the 1986
acquisition.

See Addendum 1007-1006.

Indeed, there has been

no reflection in its financial statements of the value of the
concession

contracts, wherein
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lie

the

real

value

of

the

corpor atioi i.

See Addenc-

. .

.

-

The

concession

c on tracts are issued to an i n t en t i ona 1 ] y 1 i m i t e d nur nb e r o f
outfitters authorized to take commercial river trips through
the Grar. :

anyon.

Such contracts are required by law and

limit the number of user days any outfitter may be ^n i he
river.

Without the concession contracts, no river runners,

including GCE, can Lake commercial trips.

In other words,

without the contracts, GCE would have no business. 1
Generally accepted accounting principles allow for the
capitalization
renewing

of expenses

its National

Park

incurred
Service

by GCE defending and
concession

contracts.

However, consistent with GCE's refusal to recognize any value
in I:lie contracts, no such capitalization of GCE's substantial
attorneys'

fees and other expenses paid, to M:i :

Skeei 1 ai :i d

others in the renewal and defending of its U.S. Forest Service
contracts were never capitalized.

See Addendum 1003-1002.

Remarkably,
when
GCE
acquired
the
assets
of
Whitewater/Sobek, it booked an asset value of the concession
contracts in the amount of $500,000.00. See Addendum 1558:221557:1.
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When GCE acquired the assets of Whitewater/Sobek
booked

them

in

its

consolidated

financial

statement

and
for

December 31, 1991, it, without justification, deleted $30,000
from the booked asset value, entered an amount of $59,304 for
depreciation, included a negative cash balance of $26,382 and
included
without
account.

as

a

liability

including

a

$113,618

corresponding

for

1992

increase

trip
in

deposits
the

cash

This conduct by GCE cut another $229,000 from the

net book value as of the January of 1992.

See Addendum 1005-

1004.
GCE wrote off another $90,000 of the intangible assets of
Whitewater/Sobek from November 1991 when they were acquired
through June 30, 1992.
generally

accepted

Not only does this not comply with

accounting

principles,

but

it

further

depletes the real net book value of GCE by about $88,750.

See

Addendum 1004-1003.
As of the time Appellant was terminated in July of 1992,
there was approximately $1,107,059.45 in prepaid 1992 trip
deposits held by GCE in its liability account. Virtually none
of those deposits had been recognized as income of GCE as of
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July 1992,

pv-Pii thougli CJCE was well into its 1992 season and

even though GCE had paid $542,000 to ret:i re its long-ter t n note
See Addendum 1001 f

payable to Don Saunders in June of 1992.
8

GCE's fa i 1 i nr e to recognize these substantial receipts, or

at least a portion thereof to the extent of the business and
expenses incurred, directly and negatively affected the net
o! July 1LJ92„

book value ad
Appellees
judgment

argued

that

unsophisticated

in their

Denoyer

and

second

motion

Mathis

are

for

summary

completely

..nancial and accounting matters and that

they relied upon the accounting expertise of: the corporate
accountant Mr. Willis.

Defendant's memorandum in support of

their second motion t<.o summary judgment was not included in
the court's file prepared for this appeal.

Relevant portions

of the memorandum are included in the Supplement Addendum at
2 072-2070

Don Saunders, on the other hand, was educated in

accounting and spent his entire professional career either
running his own accounting and bookkeeping firm or as the
Chief Financial Office*, of Bayliner Marine and several other
innumerable

entities
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with

that

V, noo-employee

enterprise.

See Supplemental Addendum

2077-2073.

GCE's

accountant Mr. Willis swore in an affidavit below that "at no
time has any officer, director, or shareholder of GCE engaged
in acts or omissions to manipulate the financial status of
GCE, nor have

they made

any

attempt

to

reduce

[Smith's]

proportionate share of the company or reduced the purchase
price

of his

stock at the

time GCE purchased

it."

See

Addendum 1641-1640. Aside from being saturated with hearsay,
Mr. Willis' statement is not borne out by GCE's own financial
documents.
The November 29, 198 6 Buy Sell Agreement not only gives
GCE

discretion

but

provides

that

GCE's

discretion

is

"conclusive" in the determination of the price to be paid for
the shares of stock of the terminated employee.

Given this

unfettered final discretion, the principles of good faith and
fair dealing are of critical application.
terminated

shareholder,

may

justifiably

Smith, as any
expect

to

compensated for his share of the real value of GCE.
record
several

below,

including

GCE's

financial

issues of fact directly related
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records,

be
The

creates

to GCE's history

accounting practices and the substantial negative impact they
had on the calculation, of net book val i le as of J\ lly ] 0 02, as
well as the question of whether the conduct of GCE and the
individual Appellees comported with their obligations of good
faith and fair dealing under the buy-se] ] agreement .

The

evidence supports Smith's claim that Appellees breached the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in the buysell agreement when they failed to correct hi stori c accounti i i g
practices so the calculation actually reflected GCE's value as
of July 1992.
III.

APPELLANT IS ENTITLED

M M-N

I-

f]V liAMAOK'-

PROVED AT TRIAL.
A claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing sounds in contract rather than tort and in
and of itself will not entitle a claimant to punitive damages.
E.g.

Cook Associates,

(Utah 1983).

Inc.

v.

Warnick,

664 P.2d 1161, 1167

However, punitive damages can be awarded in a

contract action where the elements of a separate tort are
established.
Co.,

Ill

Gagon v. State

Farm Mutual

P. 2d 325 (Utah 1988).
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Automobile

Insurance

Ii I tl: le i i istai it case, Smith has

plead

and

produced

evidence

that

Denoyer

and

Mathis

intentionally, wilfully, if not recklessly undertook to learn
the operation of the business from Smith and then terminate
his

involvement

Supplemental

as

an

Addendum

employee

and

2079-2078.

shareholder.
Further,

See

Smith

was

wrongfully deprived of the economic value of his interest in
GCE when he was forced by Appellees in concert to sell his
stock for a price which was based on an artificially low
valuation of GCE,

See Addendum 293-291.

The purpose of

punitive damages is to punish and deter intentional acts of
misconduct such as those alleged to have been engaged in by
Appellees in this case.

See Hall

v. Wal-Mart

Stores,

Inc.,

959 P.2d 109, 114 (Utah 1998) (Justice Russon, dissenting) .
Viewed against the backdrop of Utah R.Civ. P. 54(c) (1) , which
provides that "every final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled,
even if the party has not demanded

such relief

in his

pleadings," the Utah Supreme Court has gone so far as to state
that an award of punitive damages may obtain even when not
plead and without a formal amendment of pleadings.
C:\MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbrief.fin.wpd
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"If the

plaintiff

were

able

t; n adduce

the necessary

foundational

evidence at trial, she could claim punitive damages iinder Riile
54(c) .

"

Behrens v. Raleigh

Hills

Hosp. Inc.,

1175, 1181 82 (Utah 1983) (quoting 6 .J Moore, W
J. Wicker, Moore's
Ed. 1983)).

Federal

Practice,

675 P.2d

Taggart and

"f 54.60 at: 1212-14 (2d

Smith should therefore not be precluded by a

ruling of si immar> judgment from presenting evidence, and if
such evidence supports such an award, from recover ' - ;: * i in:i tive
damages at trial.
Appellees' motion

The court therefore erred

.:. granting

in legaid l.> Smith's claim :or punitive

damages.
VI

A REASONABLE EXTENSION OF UTAH CASE LAW JUSTIFIES
RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING T N THIS CASE,
Under ceratin circumstances, the Utah Supreme Coi irt has

permitted recovery of attorneys' fees as consequential damages
in claims of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.

See Canyon Country Store

420 (Utah 1989).
for

recovery

v. Bracey,

781 P.2d 414,

The Court states, "Canyon Country's claim

of fees

was predicated

on the theory

that

attorney fees were an item of consequential damages flowing
C:\MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbrief.fm.wpd
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from the insurers' breach of contract.

This is a legitimate

theory of damages, as the trial court recognized."

Id.

The

language of the court did not expressly limit its decision
only to actions based on an insurer's breach of contract.
But the court, in fact, disregarded such a limitation when it
extended the "broad range of recoverable damages for breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing" to include
attorneys' fees in employment claims.
Utah,

See Heslop

v. Bank of

839 P.2d 828, 840-41 (Utah 1992).
The award of attorneys' fees is within the discretion of

the trial court and determined based on evidence presented at
trial. See, e.g.

Baldwin

v. Burton,

850 P. 2d 1188, 1199 (Utah

1993) (attorneys' fees are in the discretion of the trial
court); Commerce

Financial

v.

Markwest

Corp.,

806 P.2d 200,

204 (Utah App. 1990) (failure to present evidence at trial
results in no award of attorneys' fees).

The evidence below

is that Smith, as an employee and participant in the GCE
venture with Denoyer, Mathis and Saunders was subject to
termination from employment and exclusion from participation
in GCE upon the decision of any two of the participating
C:\MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbrief.fm.wpd
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owners/empl oyees/directors , Further, 1 :i Is stock was subject to
immediate liquidation, with the determination of the purchase
price to be made in the sole and conclusive discretion of GCE
and its accountant.

;s'ee Addendum 2 93-2 91

circumstances in Canyon Country
Court

recognized

that

v.

Bracey,

attorneys'

Not unlike the
where the Supreme

fees

as

a

type

of

consequential damages was a legitimate theory of damages, the
nature

of

the

relationship

between

Smith,

GCE

and 1:1le

individual Appellees in light of the latter's discretion and
control over his employment, the: r discretion and control over
the

forced

acquisition

of his

shares

of

stock and

their

discretion and control over the determination of the value of
the

purchase

relationship

price

of

such

stock

is

analogous

to

the

between an insurer and an insured where

the

insurer has little or no ability to negotiate provisions of
its terms of insurance or over Mnr- handling aud paying of
claims.
Heslop,
771

See Canyon

Country

Store

at 419-420.

Similarly, in

where the court, citing Beru£>e v. Fashion
P.2d

1033

"consequential
C:\MyFiles\SMlTH\Appellantbrief.fin.wpd

(Utah
damages

1989)
are

for

'those
43

the

Centre

proposition

reasonably

within

Ltd.,
that
the

contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at
the time the contract was made'", Heslop
a

party

to

an

employment

agreement

at 840, noted where
finds

itself

in a

"particularly vulnerable position once the employer breaches
the employment

xv

agreement

consequential

damages

including attorneys' fees could be reasonably foreseeable by
the

employer

under

wrongful termination.

the
Id.

circumstances
at 840-841.

of

the

employer's

Like Heslop,

Smith

upon his precipitous termination and concomitant forced buy
out of his stock in the enterprise, was left with no option
but to file suit to enforce his employment contract as well as
the buy-sell agreement and consequently would foreseeably be
required to incur attorneys' fees.

Cf.

Heslop

at 841.

The

evidence submitted during the summary judgment proceedings in
this case to the court below therefore justified allowing
Smith's claim for attorneys' fees as consequential damages.
The court below erred, therefore, in granting Appellees'
motion for summary judgment on the question of Smith's claim
for attorneys' fees.

C:\MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbrief.fin.wpd

44

'IT

SMITH IS ENTITLED TO AMEND HIS

C0 MPLAINT

TO INCLUDE

AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT.
The trial court is granted the discretion to determine
whether or not to allow leave to a party litigant to amend the
pleadings to conform with the evidence .

See Utah R, C:i v. P.

15(b) . An alternative theory of recovery in light of Smith's
contract claims includes unjust enrichment if Smith can show
(1) a benefit is conferred on one person by another; (2) the
conferree appreciates or has knowledge of the benefit; and,
(3) the acceptance or retention by the conferred is under such
circumstances as to make it inequitab] e foi: the conferree
retain the benefit without payment of its value.
Towers

Ass'n,

Inc.

1192 (Utah 19 96).
u

v.

CCI Mechanical,

Inc.,

In America n Towei s

See

»

American

930 P.2d 1182,

t h e coi ir t c o n t i n u e d ,

[i]n other words, the remedy is one of restitution designed

to

restore

defendant."

a plaintiff
Id.

a benefit

unjustly

enjoyed

by

a

"The doctrine is designed t: provide an

equitable remedy where one does not exist at law. In other
words, if a legal remedy is available, such as a breach of an
express contract, the law will not :i i: i ip] ;\:l r the equitable remedy
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of unjust enrichment."
Smith

sought

the

Id.

[citations omitted]

alternative

equitable

theory

at 1192.
of

unjust

enrichment if the court below were to have concluded that
there was no legal basis to seek recovery of a portion of the
refund by GCE of the Arizona amusement tax under the November
29, 1986 buy-sell agreement.
In response to Smith's second set of interrogatories on
about March 1, 1999, the Appellees first disclosed that GCE
received a "refund of $907,916.94 in three payments in late
1995 or early 1996" of an Arizona amusement tax assessed GCE
from 19 86 through 19 92.
No.

6.

On

about

See Addendum 918-917, Interrogatory

March

18,

1999,

Smith

first

had

the

opportunity to inspect some of GCE's records related to the
refund.

GCE disclosed that it refunded to its customers a

small percentage of the refund, and treated the balance, u as
corporate income during the quarter it was received."

See

Addendum 917-915, Interrogatory Nos. 6 and 11.
The Arizona amusement tax was collected from GCE as a
concessionaire running trips through the Grand Canyon from
1986 through 1992.

C:\MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbrief.fm.wpd

A portion of all revenue generated by GCE

4 O

during that period was paid to the state of Arizona.

GCE

retained counsel who pursued the claim with the state of
Arizona until finally recovering the full refund by 1996. The
Affidavit of Ann M. Dumenil, counsel for GCE is included in
the Addendum at pages 1756-1751.

It is undisputed that GCE

received a refund from approximately $907,916.94 by early
1996.

It is also undisputed

that the refund was

of an

amusement tax collected during the period of Smith's ownership
from 1986 through 1992.

It is also undisputed that at the

time of the Appellees' forced buy out of Smith's stock, the
net

book

value

of

the

corporation

approximately $750,000.00.
the

refund

as

Interrogatory

corporate
No.

9.

was

determined

to be

It is undisputed that GCE treated
income.

The

refund

See Addendum
constitutes

917-916,
an

asset

developed during Smith's ownership of GCE. That value was not
included in the determination of his net book value in July
1992.
it

When it was paid and realized by GCE in 1995 and 1996

constituted

a benefit

bestowed

Appellees at Smith's expense.

on GCE

and

the

other

Finally, it is undisputed that

GCE appreciates and has knowledge of the Arizona amusement tax
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47

refund.

If GCE and the other Appellees were allowed to keep

the refund of the tax collected and taken from GCE during
Smith's ownership, without paying him for his pro rated share,
a substantial inequity would occur. The inequity would exceed
in value the total amount paid Smith during his forced buy out
for his shares of GCE in 1992.
The undisputed facts support a basis for allowing Smith
leave to amend his complaint to assert an alternative unjust
enrichment claim.

The court below erred in denying Smith's

motion for leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing facts and law, Smith respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's dismissal
of his claims arising from his employment with GCE, reverse
its dismissal of Smith's good faith and fair dealing claim
based

on Appellees'

failure

to make

generally

acceptable

accounting adjustments in their determination of net book
value at the time of the buy out, and reverse the trial
court's dismissal of Smith's claim for punitive damages and
attorneys' fees.
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DATED this

^4

day of April, 2 002.
STIRBA & HATHAWAY

By:.
BENSON L. HAfHAWAY, JR.
CORBIN B. GORDON
Attorneys for Appellant
and Cross/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Vff day of April, 2002,1 caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
APPELLEES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following, using the method
indicated below:
John A. Anderson
Matthew M. Durham
STOEL RIVES LLP
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KANE, STATE OF UTAH

MARC SMITH,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 940600003

vs.
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO.;
MARTIN MATHIS; MICHAEL DENOYER;
RONALD R. SMITH; DONALD
SAUNDERS, JOHN DOES 1 through
5 and JANE DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

(Condensed Transcript)
* * *

DEPOSITION OF:

LINDA RAE HOLLANDER

TAKEN ON:

May 21, 1997

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER
P.O. BOX 1534
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84771
(801)674-1283

2079

LINDA RAE KOLJDVNDER
28

26
1

A. Yes.

1 after the sale of the company, probably in - in probably

2

Q.

2 the first or second year.

3

Did that also decrease over time? That is, her

3

visits to the office?

Q,

Do you remember anything else about the

4

A. Yes.

4

substance of those conversations with Mr, Smith about the

5

Q,

5

poor relationship he had with Marc Smith?

Did the tension between Marc and Ron continue

6

after the sale?

6

7

A. Yes.

7

other - with his family, of course - with his brothers

8

Q.

8

and sisters. It - it destroyed his family relationship

9

with the rest of his family.

9

Would you characterize it as getting worse,

better or about the same?

A.

It also caused a very poor relationship with the

10

A.

I would say probably a little worse.

10

Q.

And why do you feel that way?

11

Q.

Okay. And how was it that this worsening of the

11

A.

It was because they felt that Ron had not

12 tension manifested itself to you? What things did you

12 treated Marc fairly, I guess, in the sale of the company.

13

notice -

13

14

A.

Ron started coming into the office less. When

Q.

Did you feel that Ron had not treated Marc

14 fairly in - in terms of the sale of the company?

15 he did come in, Ron - Marc would either - he would get up

115

16 and leave.

116 company. I can't say that - and I don't - and as far as

A.

I - he let everyone know he was selling the

17 I knew, there was no agreement between the two brothers

17

Q.

Did it manifest itself in any other ways to you?

18

A,

Not that I'm aware of.

18 as - that he would have part - you know, other than that

19

Q.

Okay. Did you attribute Ron coming into the

19 he tried to make a place for him in the company when the

20 office less to this poor relationship he had with his

20 company sold.

21

brother?

t21

22

A.

Yes.

22

23

Q.

Between 1986 and 1992, when Marc left the employ

;23

Q.

Okay. Was it your understanding that Ron Smith

had tried to make a place for Marc in the new company?
A. Yes.

24

of Grand Canyon, did you ever discuss with Marc his

24

Q.

On what basis did you understand that?

25

relationship with Ron?

25

A.

That he was going to be one of the partners in

27

29

1

A.

Pardon?

! 1 the company.

2

Q.

Between 1986 and mid 1992 - July, 1992, when

| 2

3

Marc was separated from the company, did you ever discuss

4

5

5

I donl recall discussing it with Marc. I may

6

have. Idonl recall it right-I may have. I don't

7

really recall it.

8
9

Q.

Do you recall discussing it with Ron during that

same time frame?

All right. What understanding did you have as

| 3 to Ron Smith's role in - in securing a place in the new

4 with Marc the - this tension between himself and Ron?
A.

Q.

I 6

company for Marc Smith?
A.

If it hadn't have been for Ron Smith doing it,

it wouldn't have happened.

7

Q.

How do you know that?

8

A.

Because the other two members of it didn't

9

really - really want a third member or a third partner.

10

A.

Very-yes.

10

11

Q.

Okay. And what do you recall discussing with

11 would be Mr. DeNoyer and Mr. Mathis?

12
13
14

Ron in that connection?
A.

He still really didnl know why Marc was so

upset with him. I think he felt like he had tried to talk

Q.

And the other two members you're referring to

12

A.

That's correct.

13

Q.

And you said that the other two did not want a

14 third partner, is that right?

15 to - to Marc and was unable to talk with him.

15

A.

That's right.

16

16

Q.

Did you have any conversation with Mr. DeNoyer

Q.

Was this something that Ron communicated to you

17 in a personal conversation face-to-face?

17 or Mr. Mathis when they indicated as much to you?

18

A.

Yes.

18

19

Q.

Do you recall having more than one conversation

19 right after the sale of the business. Marty was very

A.

I was sitting in the room when they discussed it

20 with Mr. Smith about that?

20 disappointed. He did not want to have a third partner.

21

A.

I think so.

21 And Michael just said, "We'll deal with it."

22

Q.

Could you, as you sit here today, assign any

23

time period to one or more of those conversations? In

24

other words, it occurred in this year or that year?

25

A.

I cant say specifically what year. It was

22
23
24

Q.

And this was in - at the end of 1986, after the

business sold?
A.

Yes. Shortly thereafter. Just when the papers

25 were being finalized.

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL .DISTRICT COURT .
IN AtfD FOR KANE COUNTY, StfATE OF UTAH

MARC SMITH,
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PLAINTIFF,
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'

,
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-
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) CASE NO. 940600003

VS.

)

GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO.,
MARTIN MATHIS, MICHAEL DENOYER,
RONALD R. SMITH, DONALD SAUNDERS,
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 5 AND JANE
DOES 1 THROUGH 5.
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DEFENDANTS.

DEPOSITION OF DON SAUNDERS

TAKEN; APRIL 18, 1997
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INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS
5980 South Fashion Blvd.
Murray, Utah 84107
&63-1396
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D e p o s i t i o n o f DONALD A. SAUNDERS, t a k e n on b e h a l f

2

Plaintiff,

3

I s l a n d , W a s h i n g t o n , on A p r i l 1 8 , 1 9 9 7 , commencing a t

|4

a t 920 H i l d e b r a n d Ln. N . E . ,

8 : 0 0 a . m . , b e f o r e KELLY SOMMERVILLE,

of

1

Bainbridge

2
3
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STIRBA 6 HATHAWAY
BY: BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR.
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S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 84111
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DONALD A. SAUNDERS,
was duly sworn, was examined and

Registered

5

10

Page 4
Salt Lake City, Utah, April 18, 1997, 8:00 a.m.
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testified as follows:
BY MR. HATHAWAY:
Q. Don, would you state and spell your full name
for the record for us?
A. Donald, D-o-n-a-l-d, Arthur, A-r-t-h-u-r
Saunders, S-a-u-n-d-e-r-s.
Q. What's your address?
A. 5261 Battle Point Drive NE, Bainbridge Island,
Washington 98110.
Q. How long now have you lived on Bainbridge
Island?
A. Year and-a-half.
Q. Do you still have a residence in Arlington,
Washington?
A. No.
Q. Sold that place?
A. Yes.
Q. What is your birth date?
A. 7/25/34.
Q. Give me an idea if you would, Don, as to your
educational background.
A. I graduated from Lake Washington High School

1

Page 5
and then I did about 200 credit hours at University of
Washington but I didn't technically graduate in
accounting. I took a lot of accounting courses and
various other courses that I felt would further my
accounting background. I was in public accounting
business at the time, but I didn't need a certificate
because I was in business with my father.
Q. What did your father do?
A. He was a public accountant.
Q. So you were working with him doing those types
of things?
A. Yes.
Q. When was it that you finished any formal
education at University of Washington?
A. Probably the last regular course, see, I've
taken courses there. I guess I don't know what you mean
by formal I kept taking courses off and on for, you
know, where they had seminars and different things like
that for years.
Q. Did you?
A. 20 years, yeah.
Q. Yeah.
A. And other places, you know, that I did some.
Q. Have you ever received any certificates?
A. No.
!

ixonaenseit
1
2
,. 3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
117
118
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Page 6
Q. No graduation diploma?
A. From the university?
Q. Right
A. No.
Q. And you're not a C.P.A.?
A. No.
Q. Were you born in Washington?
A. Yes.
Q. Whereabouts?
A. Seattle.
Q. Lived here all your life?
A. Yes, uh-huh, lived in the state of Washington
all my life.
Q. Tell me if you would, Don, briefly about your
employment background starting from this point in time
when you were employed with your father.
A. I worked for my father for a few years, then as
a partner with my father for a few years, and then my
father retired and I ran the practice for a couple
years, and then I sold the practice and became the
financial officer for a boat building company.
Q. That was Bayliner Boats as I understand it?
A. Yes, uh-huh.
Q. When did you sell the practice?
A. In about September of f72.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Page 9

Page 7
1

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. What was the practice known as at the time you

2 sold it?
3

A. Saunders Accounting and Bookkeeping.

4

Q. During your work with Saunders Accounting and

5 Bookkeeping, was Bayliner one of your customers,
6 clients?
7

A. Well, maybe we better distinguish on Bayliner.

8 It started out as Puget Advanced Outboard Marine,
9 Advanced Outboard went to Advanced Outboard Marine, went
10 to Puget Plastics, went to some different names but
11 for - we could just for simplicity purposes say
12 Bayliner. Bayliner was the name of the boats the
13 company built.
14

Q. I understand.

15

A. And so it's commonly known as that. The

16 corporate names were different things as well through
17 the years.
18

Q. What was the corporate name at the time you

19 became involved as the chief financial officer?
20

A. By then it was Bayliner Marine.

21

Q. And that was about in 1972?

22

A. '72, yes. I had for a number of years before

23 that done all our accounting and our office had done all
24 the payrolls and payables and everything for what was to
25 become eventually Bayliner Marine.
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Q. How many employees were there at Saunders
Accounting and Bookkeeping at the time you sold it?
A. Five.
Q. Why don't you describe for us what you did
after going to work for Bayliner as the chief financial
officer.
A. When I went to work for Bayliner, I handled all
of the financial matters, the trucking department, the
— all the computer operations, the health, accident,
all those types of things, all the employee benefit
programs. All of the hiring policies and hiring of all
the people were in my departments. I used to say it was
everything the other guys didn't want to do actually
there, but anyway, those types of things. I got
involved in manufacturing from time to time and in
the - somewhat in the design of the boats, pretty much
the whole thing.
Eventually, by 1976 there was the five people who
eventually were the owners of the company, myself and
three other guys. We had lunch together every day and
we, between the four of us, we pretty much basically ran
the company under us because we were - if everybody was
in town eating lunch together every day, we got involved
in each other's parts of the business. So I was
involved in everything, but primarily the parts I named.
Q. When did you become an owner in this entity
that became Bayliner Boats?
A. When I sold my accounting practice. The owner,
the person at that time that basically owned the whole
thing, Orin Edson, said he was going to have to get a
financial officer to come in and work in the company if
I wouldn't sell my accounting practice and go to work
for him. And so I made him a deal where he'd sell me
part of the company if I sold the accounting practice
and go to work for him simply because I was a little
bored with the accounting. It's the same old thing
every day. Bayliner was exciting and it was growing., I
knew I was taking a pretty good risk, but I just was
really impressed with it because my accounting practice,
the year I sold it, which brought it to a head was I had
taken two months off my practice. I had about a hundred
clients and it ran so smooth and was so good I'd just
take the summer off and tour around the country with my
kids. And while I was gone the two months they'd got in
some problems with personnel and everything at Bayliner,
so when I got back Orin says, Don, God, I've got to have
you do that. That was one of my very wise decisions and
I got rid of it.
Q. What percentage did you buy?
A. It varied and I bought more later. You know, I
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can't remember what percentage that was. Eventually I 1
owned about four percent of Bayliner.
2
Q. Was Bayliner a publicly traded corporation?
3
A. No. When we sold the company in 1986, there
4
were four stockholders, two other people with the same 5
6
stock as me and then a majority. Orin owned the
7
majority.
8
Q. Who were the four shareholders with you?
9
A. Vinton Sommerville, David Livingston, and J.
10
OrinEdson.
II
Q. J. Orin Edson, and I take it from your prior
12
statements that he was the primary 13
A. Yes.
14
Q. — shareholder?
15
A. Yes. He'd started the original company which
16
sold used outboards in Seattle.
17
Q. And he sold to the Brunswick Corporation,
18
correct?
19
A. We sold to the Brunswick.
20
Q. I'm sorry, you sold.
21
A. Uh-huh.
22
Q. Brunswick, they still own Bayliner, don't they?
23
A. Yes. And there was a number of names. It
24
wasn't just Bayliner. Bayliner was the biggest
25
product. We had other companies within it. We had
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1
A. To some extent. Again, we ate lunch together
bought Chrysler Marine Corporation. You know, we had
2 every day.
other boat companies that were — Blue Fin Aluminum
3
Q. It was an oversight kind of function?
Boats, things like that, but Bayliner basically, yes,
4
A. Yeah. We'd talk about that and then we that's what we sold.
5 every Monday night we had a meeting for three or four
Q. Can you tell me what the other entities were
6 hours and that also included - and the lunch included
that was part of that deal?
7 maybe three other key personalities. It would vary from
A. I can't remember. There's lots of them. I'd
8 one to four as time went on, but it involved other
have to go through the records and look.
9 people. We were just together. I mean, we — and our
Q. But they were all included in your four percent
10 offices were all in a row in the offices, you know, so
ownership of the stock in this entity?
ill we saw each other lots.
j
A. Yes. They were all part of it. Originally
12
Q. You talked on a regular basis?
.
!
there was, you know, back in the early '70s, the common
13
A Yeah.
thing was you keep a bunch of different corporations and
14
Q. When you sold Baylienr in 1986, how many
eventually we'd put them all together because you didn't
15 employees did Bayliner have?
have any tax advantage and it got messy and everything
16
A. About 7,000.
was one corporation. So finally as we bought any other
17
Q. How many employees would you consider at least
boat company we just took the assets and we didn't do
18 as of 1986 when you sold the business to have been in a
the corporations and stuff.
19 management sort of a position?
Q. Of the four shareholders of the company, who
20
A. In some type of management, do you consider a
was most involved in these acquisitions and handling —
21 leadman, is he a management person?
at least the way these other business entities or
22
Q. That's a broad question.
enterprises you described were handled and incorporated
23
A. Yeah.
into the business?
A. Orin Edson and I. If it was a large one, we'd
24
Q. Were there other employees of the entity
generally negotiate it together because we'd play ping
25 besides the four of you which you considered to be key

I
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pong with the purchasers, you know. And then if it was,
you know, not a major deal, you know, we're buying a
200,000 square foot plant or something in Mississippi, I
might go negotiate it myself or whatever.
Q. Once you made the determination in this prior
entity to acquire an asset or to acquire an enterprise,
who was it that set up the actual structure, by the
Bayliner group or Bayliner company for lack of a better
name, to handle that new enterprise?
A. I don't understand your question.
Q. Well, you testified that in the ' 70s
everybody - you used to set up the subsidiaries —
A. Uh-huh, right.
Q. — for other corporations that were involved
and ultimately there was no tax advantage to doing that
so you brought all the businesses in?
A. Sure, yep.
Q. As these acquisitions were subsequently made,
were they just purchased in the name of this Bayliner
company?
A. Yep, uh-huh.
Q. Were any of the four or the three remaining
shareholders involved at all with you directly in the
aspects of the business you described, you were involved
in primarily the accounting business?
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personnel involved in the operation of the business?
A. Many.
Q. Many?
A. We had 7,000 employees. There was many, many,
many.
Q. Was there a core group of decision makers for
the company besides the four of you?
A. Yes. The other people that went to like lunch
with us and met in our Monday night meeting were part of
that core group. The guy that ran our marketing or I
mean, actually our advertising department,
communications we called it, the guy that was the
bruntman as far as all the manufacturing operations.
Oh, various other people. There was probably 30 key
people. There was probably 30 people say in 1986 that
earned more than 100,000 a year and those are fairly at that time that would be like a quarter of a million
today. Those were fairly key management people who
worked with us.
Q. Was there ever a point in time that the four of
you that owned and ultimately controlled the company had
disagreements about how to handle certain aspects of the
business?
A. Yeah, occasionally, uh-huh.
Q. Is it fair to say that that wasn't something
_ _ _
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two times that we had over 18 years we really had any,
you know, really dispute that I had to kind of mediate
in the middle of you might say over that many years. So
there wasn't a lot. We were - our business was making
money and we concentrated on that. We didn't have a lot
of infighting in the company. We didn't have - we were
very untypical of a very large company, you know, or
large company because we didn't have a bunch of
politicking going on, and that's where you get all of
this infighting, you know. We didn't have it. I mean,
we paid our people well and we kept them real busy and
it's like I always said, just run the office short of
people so they don't have time to get their little
political groups together. So we didn't have it. It
was a really rare incidence.
Q. What have you done professionally since 1986
when you sold the business?
A. Professionally, nothing.
Q. Nothing.
A. I have businesses that other people --1 mean,
it's like this, I don't get involved in them. I'm very
careful to stay kind of distanced from anything because
I don't want any involvement in my company.
Q. Tell me if you would, Don, what businesses
you've got going besides the Grand Canyon Expeditions?
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that necessarily was uncommon?
MR. ANDERSON: I'll object to the question. That's
overbroad.
THE WITNESS: Well, actually it was - it was very
uncommon in our company.
BY MR. HATHAWAY:
Q. How about within this group of 30 core people,
was it - I take it that some of those may have been
involved in generally the same aspect of the business?
A. Yes, uh-huh.
Q. In your experience with Bayliner Corporation,
isn't it true that on occasion disputes arise as to how
to handle the operation of the business?
A. Not that I can really call disputes. We paid
our help extremely well Probably our key people were
getting twice as much as anybody else in the industry.
We never had anybody stolen from us because everybody
would think I can't pay this guy that kind of money, so
we didn't have that kind of problem, so we had the very
best. So we, I mean, it was rare that I can ever
remember any disputes among the people. I mean, we had
the best and they worked it out and they were
reasonable. We didn't have that kind of problem.
It's like you ask the question about Orin, Slim, and
Dave and I getting at each other. I don't remember but
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A. Let's see, right now, I believe I don't have
any except a land development company and GCE. I have
another corporation I guess it's got some land in it but
it's not very active. My land development company has
quite a bit. I have a son-in-law that runs that.
Q. What's the name of that company?
A. It's SK. Enterprises Company or it's Donald Don Saunders DBA. It's not a corporation.
Q. And I take it you're not in any way involved in
the management or operation of the business of the
entity?
A. I've been one time in the last few years just
on one piece of property where they were having some
problems selling it, and I got in with the guys that
were buying it and negotiated the sale price.
Q. What sort of development do they do?
A. Vacant lands, 300 acre lots, 1000 acre lots,
5000 acre lots, that kind of property.
Q. Is this recreational property?
A. Residential.
Q. Residential, so estate-type lots?
A. Yeah, uh-huh.
Q. Whereabouts are they operating?
A. Snohomish County in the state of Washington.
Q. Maybe you better spell Snohomish.

Page 14

RECEIVED
MAR 2 2 1999 ^

STOEL RIVES LLP
John A. Anderson (4464)
Matthew M. Durham (6214)
201 Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3131

Stirba and Hathaway

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARC SMITH,
Plaintiff,

GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS
CO.; MARTIN MATHIS; MICHAEL
DENOYER; DONALD SAUNDERS;
JOHN DOES 1 through 5; and JANE
DOES 1 through 5,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
(HEARING REQUESTED)
(FILED UNDER SEAL)
Civil No. 940600003

Defendants.

Hon. K. L. Mclff

Defendants Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. ("Grand Canyon" or the "Company"),
Donald Saunders ("Saunders"), Michael Denoyer ("Denoyer"), and Martin Mathis ("Mathis")
(collectively referred to as "Defendants") submit the following points and authorities in
support of their motion for summary judgment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendants previously moved for summary judgment on all claims for relief set forth
in Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint. The court granted partial summary judgment to
Defendants, dismissing the first claim for relief in its entirety and the second claim for relief in
SLCl-47481.2 33714-0001

attorney, Mr. Skeen, that Plaintiffs stock was being purchased and he would need to prepare a
buy-out amount consistent with the Buy/Sell Agreement. LL
Denoyer and Mathis were completely unsophisticated infinancialand accounting
matters. They relied upon the accounting expertise of the Company's accountant Mr. Willis.
Mr. Willis has attested that there was no manipulation of the books and records of Grand
Canyon to create an artificially low buy-out amount for Plaintiff. LL 1f 22. Moreover, this
theory is seriously undermined by the fact that Plaintiff, in essence, dictated the timing of his
departure.4
Plaintiffs counsel also appears to be under the mistaken impression that Grand
Canyon's investment in White Water mysteriously disappeared in the consolidated financial
statement prepared by Mr. Willis. In fact, the investment appears in the asset column of White
Water that is added to Grand Canyon's assets. See Exs. "F", MG", and "H". Counsel's
libelous suggestion that Grand Canyon engaged in income tax fraud through erasure is
unsupported by any factual evidence and simply indicates the depths to which counsel will sink
to manufacture an illusory issue of fact. See Plaintiff's counsel's letter to Court dated January
18, 1999 (attached hereto as Exhibit "R").
Plaintiffs counsel has also misrepresented to the Court previously that Grand Canyon's
financial condition was worse in July 1992 than at any point in the history of the Company.
As noted at the last hearing, and confirmed through Mr. Willis' Affidavit and the data
available to Plaintiffs counsel, Grand Canyon's position was significantly better in July 1992
4

The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff demanded that his employment
difficulties with Grand Canyon be resolved during the 1992 rafting season, rather than thereafter
as Denoyer and Grand Canyon would have preferred. See Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, filed October 30, 1998 (citing deposition testimony).
SLCl-47481.2 33714-0001
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DATED this?5?day of March, 1999.
STOEL RIVES LLP

Mfcu
John A. Anderson
Matthew M. Durham
Attorney for Defendants
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NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE
PERMANENT
LAW REPORTS.
UNTIL
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR
WITHDRAWAL.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
James DISHINGER and Nancy Dishinger dba
TCBY Yogurt,
Plaintiffs, Appellants, and Cross-appellees,
v.
Jana POTTER dba Silver Queen Hotel, Defendant,
Appellee, and
Cross-appellant.
No. 20000081-CA.
June 28, 2001.
Commercial tenants filed declaratory judgment
action asking court to interpret lease provision
regarding
monthly rental rate.
Landlord
counterclaimed for breach of lease and unlawful
detainer. After jury trial, the Third District Court,
Coalville Department, Robert K. Hilder and Pat B.
Brian, JJ., entered judgment for landlord in amount of
$8,730.
Tenants appealed, and landlord crossappealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that:
(1) jury's special verdict was not advisory, and thus
trial court was bound by jury's findings; (2) accord and
satisfaction precluded finding of unlawful detainer; (3)
waiver provision in lease did not preclude finding of
accord and satisfaction; (4) landlord was entitled to
administrative fees; (5) landlord was not entitled to late
fees; and (6) remand was necessary to determine
prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees.
Reversed and remanded.
Orme, J., dissented and filed opinion.
[1] Appeal and Error <®^> 1078(1)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(K) Error Waived in Appellate Court
30kl078 Failure to Urge Objections
30kl078(l) In General
Tenants could raise issue of accord and satisfaction
on appeal, even though issue was not raised in
pleadings, as record showed that evidence regarding
existence of accord and satisfaction was presented at
Copyright (c) West Group 2002

trial, jury was instructed on and made findings of fact
that supported accord and satisfaction, and landlord had
opportunity to prepare and meet issue. Rules CivProc.,
Rule 15(b).
[2] Pleading <®=»427
302 —
302XVIII Waiver or Cure of Defects and
Objections
302k427 Objections to Evidence as Not Within
Issues.
If an issue is fully tried, a court may decide the issue
and deem the pleadings amended even if the issue was
not originally pleaded, and whether the pleadings may
be deemed amended depends on whether the opposing
party had a fair opportunity to prepare and meet the
issue.
[3] Appeal and Error <@==>498.1
30 —
30X Record
30X(A) Matters to Be Shown
30k498 Presentation and Reservation of
Grounds of Review
30k498.1 In General.
Commercial tenants who appealed from jury's
special verdict were not required to provide transcript
of proceedings below or marshal evidence, as tenants
were not challenging findings of fact but trial court's
application of law to jury's special verdict findings.
[4] Declaratory Judgment <©^369
118A —
118 AHI Proceedings
118 AHI(F) Hearing and Determination
118Ak369 Verdict and Findings.
Jury's special verdict in declaratory judgment action
brought by tenants against landlord was not advisory,
and thus trial court was bound by jury's findings, as
both parties pursued legal, not equitable claims, tenants
demanded jury trial on claims, and trial court did not
inform parties or jury that jury was merely advisory.
Rules CivProc., Rule 49(a).
[5] Trial <®=^347
388 —
388IX Verdict
388K(B) Special Interrogatories and Findings
388k346 Power of Jury to Find Specially
388k347 Special Verdict.
In the case of a special verdict, the jury only finds
the facts, and the court applies the law thereto and
renders the verdict.
claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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[6] Accord and Satisfaction <©=> 10(1)
8 —
8k6 Part Payment
8kl0 Disputed or Unliquidated Claims
8kl0(l) In General.
[See headnote text below]
[6] Accord and Satisfaction <®^> 11(2)
8 —
8k6 Part Payment
8kll Conditioned on Acceptance as Payment in
Full
8kl 1(2) Remittances on Condition.
Accord and satisfaction was established in dispute
between commercial tenant and landlord as to rental
rate, and thus tenants were not in unlawful detainer,
where jury found a good faith agreement over amount
due under lease, payments tendered were made in foil
satisfaction of disputed rent, and landlord negotiated
check, which contained notation that amount was for
new base rent.
[7]
Accord and Satisfaction <®^ 1
8 —
8kl Nature and Requisites in General.
To establish an accord and satisfaction, three
elements must be present: (1) an unliquidated claim or
a bona fide dispute over the amount due, (2) a payment
offered as full settlement of the entire dispute, and (3)
an acceptance of the payment as Ml settlement of the
dispute.
[8] Accord and Satisfaction <®s* 10(1)
8 —
8k6 Part Payment
8kl0 Disputed or Unliquidated Claims
8kl0(l) In General.
To satisfy the requirement that there be a good-faith
disagreement over the amount due under the contract,
as required to establish an accord and satisfaction, the
disagreement need not be well-founded, so long as it is
in good faith.
[9] Contracts <®^> 15
95 —
951 Requisites and Validity
951(B) Parties, Proposals, and Acceptance
95kl5 Necessity of Assent.
A condition precedent to the enforcement of any
contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the
parties, which must be spelled out, either expressly or
implicitly, with sufficient definiteness to be enforced.

[10] Trial <@^>358
388 —
388IX Verdict
388IX(B) Special Interrogatories and Findings
388k358 Inconsistent Findings.
Where a jury's special verdict findings support
inconsistent legal claims, a court is not precluded from
applying the law to those findings and entering
judgment for a party on one theory, as a matter of law,
which precludes judgment on another inconsistent legal
theory. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 49(a).
[11] Accord and Satisfaction <S=» 10(1)
8 —
8k6 Part Payment
8kl0 Disputed or Unliquidated Claims
8kl0(l) In General.
[See headnote text below]
[11] Accord and Satisfaction <®^=> 11 (2)
8 —
8k6 Part Payment
8kl 1 Conditioned on Acceptance as Payment in
Full
8k 11(2) Remittances on Condition.
Waiver provision in commercial lease providing
that acceptance of rent did not constitute waiver did not
preclude finding of accord and satisfaction based on
tenants' tender of check for disputed rent amount, as
lease provision did not provide that acceptance of
partial rent did not constitute accord and satisfaction,
and landlord could not claim that check tendered by
tenants was partial rent, as there was no agreement as
to amount of rent upon expiration of lease.
[12] Landlord and Tenant <®=^238
233 —
233 VIII Rent and Advances
23 3 VIII(B) Actions
233k238 Costs.
Landlord was entitled to administrative fees
*726259
in dispute with commercial tenant, despite
jury's finding of accord and satisfaction with respect to
rent due, where lease unambiguously provided that
tenants would pay for all costs and fees association with
supervising and administering common areas.
[13] Landlord and Tenant <@^>216
233 —
233 VIII Rent and Advances

Copyright (c) West Group 2002 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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233 VHI(A) Rights and Liabilities
233k216 Penalties or Double Rent
Landlord was not entitled to late fees under lease
provision based on tenant's alleged failure to pay rent,
as there was accord and satisfaction as to rent due, and
thus tenants were current on rent payments
[14] Appeal and Error <§=* 1177(5)
30 —
30XVII Determination and Disposition of Cause
30XVII(P) Reversal
30k 1177 Necessity of New Trial
30kl 177(5) Errors in Rulings and
Instructions at Trial
Remand was necessary in dispute between landlord
and commercial tenants to determine which party was
entitled to attorney fees as prevailing party, where trial
court's finding of unlawful detamer was reversed on
appeal
Third District, Coalville Department
The Honorable Robert K Hilder
The Honorable Pat B Brian
Dwayne A Vance and David B Thompson, Park
City, for Appellants
Robert M Felton, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges BILLINGS, ORME, and THORNE
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge
** 1 f 1 Plaintiffs James and Nancy Dishinger dba
TCBY Yogurt (the Dishingers) appeal the trial court's
judgment finding them m unlawful detamer Defendant
Jana Potter dba Silver Queen Hotel (Potter) crossappeals the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on
the meaning of "prevailing rate" and its failure to award
her administrative, late, and attorney fees We reverse
and remand
BACKGROUND
1 2 In May of 1990, Erik Ziskend entered into a
commercial lease with Potter for premises located on
Mam Street m Park City, Utah On May 31, 1994,
Ziskend assigned the lease to the Dishingers Potter
consented to the assignment The Dishingers operated

a frozen yogurt shop on the premises
1 3 The lease provided for continuous three year
options after expiration of the initial three year lease
term Under the terms of the lease, the Dishingers, as
tenants, were required to notify Potter m writing of
then" desire to exercise the option 120 days prior to the
expiration of the current lease term
The lease
specified that the rental rate for an option period would
be "adjusted upward, but not less than the current
Minimum Monthly Rent bemg paid, to the then
prevailing rental rate of similar buildings m the Mam
Street area of Park City, Utah" (FN1)
1[4 On February 1, 1996, the Dishingers notified
Potter in writing of their desire to exercise the lease
renewal option
Thereafter, the following
correspondence took place On April 4, 1996, Potter
advised the Dishingers that the prevailing rental rate of
similar buildings on Mam Street m Park City was $30
per square foot and thus, pursuant to the lease, $30 per
square foot ($2,425 00/month) would constitute the
new base monthly rent The Dishingers responded that,
based on the appraisal they had performed, the
prevailing rental rate of similar buildings was $19 per
square foot ($1,535 83/month)
f 5 At the commencement of the July 1, 1996
renewal period, without an agreement as to what would
constitute the base monthly rent, the Dishingers began
paying rent m an amount reflecting their appraisal of
$19 per square foot They sent Potter a check for
$1,976 92, clearly notmg it was for "New Base Rent"
On July 8, 1996, Potter sent the Dishingers a notice of
default on the grounds that the Dishingers were
$889 17 delinquent m their July rental payment On
July 13, 1996, Potter served the Dishingers with a
notice to pay the remaining rent or quit On July 15,
1996, Potter negotiated the Dishinger's July 1 rent
check On the first of eveiy month, from July 1996
through June 1997, the Dishingers sent Potter a check
for $2,137 11 (FN2) reflecting $19 per square foot in
base monthly rent Potter negotiated each of those
checks
1 6 On August 8, 1996, the Dishmgers filed a
declaratory judgment action asking the trial court to
interpret the lease provision regarding the monthly
rental rate Potter counter-claimed for breach of lease
and unlawful detamer
**2 f 7 After a jury trial, the jury returned a
special verdict answering a number of factual
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questions. In the special verdict the jury found there
was a legitimate dispute as to the "then prevailing
rental rate," that the Dishingers tendered payment to
Potter in full satisfaction of the disputed amount based
on their appraisal of $19, and that Potter accepted the
rent payments after the July 13 notice to quit. The jury
also found the "then prevailing rental rate" to be $25
per square foot, and as such, Potter was entitled to
recover the balance of base rent, totaling $8,730.
1J8 The Dishingers filed a motion for entry of
judgment based on the special verdict, arguing that the
jury's special verdict established an accord and
satisfaction, which fixed the base rental rate at $19 per
square foot, and thus, they were current in monthly
payments and Potter's unlawful detainer claim should
be dismissed. The Dishingers also argued that a
determination that they were in unlawful detainer of the
premises was precluded because Potter accepted rental
payments after serving the notice to quit, thus waiving
forfeiture of the lease.
<| 9 The trial court, first Judge Brian, then Judge
Hilder in an amended judgment, entered judgment for
Potter. The trial court concluded that, based on the
findings of the jury in its special verdict, it was "clear"
that while Potter accepted payments after the notice to
quit, the amount received "did not represent a full
payment of base rent," and thus did not constitute an
accord and satisfaction. Thus, the trial court concluded
the Dishingers were in unlawful detainer and entered
judgment in favor of Potter for $8,730, which was
trebled to $26,190 pursuant to Utah Code §vnn.
78-36-10 (1996). This appeal followed.
^ 10 On appeal, the Dishingers argue the trial court
was precluded from determining they were in unlawful
detainer because the jury's special verdict established
an accord and satisfaction as a matter of law.
Alternatively, the Dishingers argue that Potter affirmed
the lease by accepting rent payments, thereby waiving
forfeiture of the lease, and thus precluding a finding of
unlawful detainer.
^ 11 Potter cross-appeals, arguing the trial court
should have instructed the jury that the "then prevailing
rental rate" meant market rate. Potter also argues the
trial court erred by failing to award her administrative
fees, late fees, and attorney fees as required by the
lease.
ANALYSIS

I. Preliminary Issues
^ 12 In addition to the claims raised in her crossappeal, Potter asserts that the Dishingers failed to
preserve their claims below, failed to provide a
transcript of the proceedings and marshal the evidence,
and cannot rely on the jury's special verdict because it
was merely advisory. Before addressing the main
substantive issues on appeal, we first address these
threshold arguments.
A. Preservation of Claims
[1][2] 113 Potter first argues the Dishingers failed
to preserve their claim of accord and satisfaction in
accordance with Rule 24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Rule 24(a)(5)(A) provides that
"[t]he brief of the appellant shall contain ... citation to
the record showing that the issue was preserved in the
trial court." Utah RApp. P. 24(a)(5)(A). The
Dishingers reference several places in the record to
show that the issue of accord and satisfaction was
preserved in the trial court. (FN3) Thus, Potter's
argument that the Dishingers did not preserve the issue
of accord and satisfaction is without merit. (FN4)
B. Marshaling the Evidence
**3 [3^[ 14 Potter next argues the Dishingers
needed to provide a transcript of the proceedings to
allow meaningful review of the evidence, and have also
failed to marshal the evidence. A transcript of the
proceedings is not required because the Dishingers are
relying on the jury's special verdict on appeal, not the
evidence presented at tria See, e.g Pugh v. North
Am. Warranty Servs., Inc. 2000 UT App 121^ 11, 1
P.3d 570. Moreover, the marshaling requirement
applies only when challenging findings of f See
Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12f 24, 973 P.2d 431.
Clearly, the Dishingers are not challenging findings of
fact. Rather, they are challenging the trial court's
application of the law to the jury's special verdict
findings and thus the Dishingers do not have the burden
of marshaling the evidence.
C. Advisory Juiy Verdict
[4] H 15 Relying oi Peirce v. Peirce 2000 UT 7,
994 P.2d 193, Potter next argues that the jury's special
verdict was merely advisory, and therefore the trial
court was not bound by the jury's findings in the special
verdict. Potter's reliance c Peirce is misplaced. In
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Peirce, the issue before the court was "whether the jury
served in an advisory capacity or whether [the] case
was tried by a jury as a matter of rig! Id alf 12.
However, the plaintiff Peirc was seeking an
equitable remedy. See id. "When a jury is used in an
equity case, it acts in an advisory a /d.ity,"
(quoting Romrell v. lions First Nat'l Ban 611 P.2d
392, 394 (Utah 1980) (quotation and citation
omitted)), " 'unless both parties have clearly consented
to accept a jury verdict.' " Id. at % 13 (quoting Romrell,
611 P.2d at 394 see als Utah R. Civ. P. 39(c).
Because the parties did not clearly consent to accept a
jury verdict, and the record indicated that the trial court
treated the jury as advisory, the court held that the jury
served only in an advisory capacity and thus afforded
no deference to its findings. See id. at Tf 15.

facts in this case, and to consider and weigh the
evidence for that purpose"; "You are exclusive
judges of the facts and the evide" (Emphasis
added.) The trial court then entered judgment,ifase<f
upon the evidence and the special verdict" (Emphasis
added.) Thus, the jury was not merely advisory.
Rather, the jury found the facts as set forth in its special
verdict and the trial court entered judgment applying
the law to those facts.

If 16 In the instant case, we are not dealing with an
action in equity. Both the Dishingers and Potter
pursued legal claims, the Dishingers specifically
demanded a jury trial on those claims, and at no time
did the trial court inform the parties or the jury that the
jury was merely advise (Goldberg v. Jay
Timmons & Assoc* 896 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah
Ct.App.1995) (stating, "if the trial court had intended ...
to use an advisory jury, it should have notified the
parties before the trial began"). Where, as here, the
case is tried to a juiy as a matter of right, Rule 49(a) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits the trial
court to "require a jury to return only a special verdict
in the form of a special written finding upon each issue
of fact." Utah R. Civ. P. 49(a). "The [trial] court then
applies the law to the facts as found and renders a
verdict." Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'? 24 Utah
2d 292, 298, 470 P.2d 393, 397 (1970) (Ellett, 1,
further opinion) (commenting on Rule 49(a)).
**4
[^[17 As Justice Ellett explained in
Brigham:
The special verdict was devised to relieve the jury
of attempting to apply the law in a complicated case
to the facts in arriving at a verdict. Instructions to
the jury are thus simplified, and the jurors may,
therefore, concentrate upon the functions which
belong to them, viz., to find the facts in the case.
Id. Thus, "[i]n [the] case of a special verdict, the
jury only finds the facts, and the court applies the law
thereto and renders the verdi< L This is what
occurred in the instant case. The trial court instructed
the jury. "[I]t is yoi exclusive duty to determine the

II. Accord and Satisfaction
[6] Tf 18 The Dishingers argue that an accord and
satisfaction occurred prior to trial which set the rental
rate at $19 per square foot thus precluding a finding of
unlawful detainer. They claim the jury's special verdict
answers require a legal determination of accord and
satisfaction. Whether the special verdict established an
accord and satisfaction is a question of law which we
review for correctness without any deference to the trial
court. SeeProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile 2000 UT 41f
17,998P.2d254.
A. Elements of Accord and Satisfaction
[7] Tf 19 To establish an accord and satisfaction,
three elements must be present: "(1) an unliquidated
claim or a bona fide dispute over the amount due; (2) a
payment offered as full settlement of the entire dispute;
and (3) an acceptance of the payment as full settlement
of the dispute." Id. at % 20 (citing Marton Remodeling
v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607,609-10 (Utah 1985)).
1. Bona Fide Dispute Over Amount Due
[8] [9] If 20 To satisfy the first element, "There must
be a good-faith disagreement over the amount due
under the contract. The disagreement need not be wellfounded, so long as it is in good Estate
Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Cc 844 P.2d 322, 326
(Utah 1992) (citing Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Manias,
699 P.2d 730, 733 (Utah 1985 Ashton v. Skeen 85
Utah 489, 496, 39 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1935)). The jury
clearly found that there was a good faith disagreement
over the amount due under the lease. (FN5) The jury
was asked:
Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you
find by a preponderance of the evidence that a
legitimate dispute existed as to the "then prevailing
rental rate of similar buildings in the Main Street
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area of Park City" at the time the [Dishingers] made
monthly rental payments based on $19 per square
foot as satisfaction in full?
**5 To this question the jury answered, "Yes."
Thus, the first element of accord and satisfaction was
established by the jury's special verdict.
2. Payment Tendered in Full Satisfaction of Dispute
f 21 The jury found that the payments tendered by
the Dishingers were made in Ml satisfaction of the
disputed rent. The jury was asked: "Considering all the
evidence in this case, do you find by a preponderance
of the evidence that the [Dishingers] notified [Potter]
that these payments were made in full satisfaction of the
disputed rent amount?" The jury answered, "Yes."
Thus, the second element of accord and satisfaction
was established by the jury's special verdict.
3. Acceptance of Payment as Full Settlement of
Dispute
If 22 In Estate Landscape, the Utah Supreme Court
reasoned that the third element of accord and
satisfaction may be satisfied by the creditor's subjective
intent to discharge an obligation by assenting to the
accord, oi conduct which gives rise to a reasonable
inference that acceptance of payment discharged the
obligation. See Estate Landscape, 844 P.2d at 330.
f 23 In the instant case, the jury found that Potter
accepted the monthly payments made by the
Dishingers. The jury was asked: "Considering all of
the evidence in this case, do you find by a
preponderance of the evidence that [Potter] accepted
the monthly rent payments made by the [Dishingers]
which are calculated at a rate of $19 per square foot?"
The jury answered, "Yes." However, the jury did not
make a finding that Potter subjectively intended to
assent to the accord. The fact that Potter counterclaimed for breach of the lease and unlawful detainer
shows she did not subjectively intend to assent to the
accord. Thus, to find an accord and satisfaction, we
must determine whether Potter's conduct established
the accord and satisfaction as a matter of law.
Tl 24 IT Estate Landscape the defendant sent the
plaintiff a check for $8,613, and followed it with a
letter stating that the check was "payment in full for
satisfaction of contracted services. If you are not
willing to accept that sum, .. in full satisfaction of the

sums due, DO NOT negotiate the check, for upon your
negotiation of that check, we will treat the matter as
fully paid.' Io at 324-25 (emphasis omitted). The
plaintiff filed suit to recover the $30,162.50 it thought
it was owed by the defendant, then negotiated the
$8,613 check, and amended its complaint to recover
the difference. See id. at 325.
K 25 The trial court ruled that negotiation of the
check did not constitute an accord and satisfaction. See
id. This court affirmed, over Judge Jackson's dissent,
reasoning that the defendant's letter was "entirely
unilateral," and that the plaintiffs
signature on the check is not an assent to an accord
not found on the face of the check as a restrictive
endorsement, where the party to whom the accord is
offered has expressly rejected the proposed accord,
continued the dispute, and filed litigation to resolve
it adversarially in court.
**<!>
Estate Landscape & Snow Removal
Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. <£ Tel. Co.,
793 P.2d 415, 419-20 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (footnote
omitted),revW, 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992).
f 26 The Utah Supreme Court disagreed and
reversed, holding, "Where, as here, the check is
tendered under the condition that negotiation will
constitute Ml settlement, mere negotiation of the check
constitutes the accord, regardless of the payee's efforts
or intent to negate the condition Estate Landscape,
844 P.2d at 330. Thus, " '[w]hat is said is overridden
by what is done, and assent is imputed as an inference
of law.' Id. (quoting Hudson v. Yonkers Fruit Co.,
258 N.Y. 168, 179 N.E. 373, 374 (1931 see also
Morton Remodeling v. Jense 706 P.2d 607, 609
(Utah 1985) (holding negotiation of check with
restrictive condition is an accord and satisfaction even
though creditor wrote "not full payment" beneath
condition prior to negotiation) Cove View Excavating
& Constr. Co. v. Fly) 758 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah
Ct.App.1988) (finding an accord and satisfaction even
though creditor crossed out restrictive condition on
check before negotiation).
^i 27 In the instant case, the Dishinger's first check
noted the amount thereof was for "New Base Rent."
Therefore, because Potter negotiated the check, which
was tendered by the Dishingers in full satisfaction of
the disputed amount of the base monthly rent, the fact
that Potter at the same time brought an action for
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breach of lease and unlawful detainer is of no legal
consequence. (FN6) The third and final element of
accord and satisfaction was established by Potter's
conduct.
B. Special Verdict
K 28 In its special verdict, the jury found: (1) "that a
legitimate dispute existed as to the 'then prevailing
rental rate of similar buildings in the Main Street area
of Park City' at the time the [Dishingers] made monthly
rental payments based on $19 per square foot as
satisfaction in full;" (2) the Dishingers "notified [Potter]
that [the] payments were made in foil satisfaction of the
disputed amount;" and (3) Potter "accepted the monthly
rent payments made by the [Dishingers] ... at a rate of
$19 per square foot."
Tl 29 However, the jury also found that the
prevailing rental rate was $25 per square foot, and that
Potter was entitled to recover the "balance of base rent"
from the Dishingers, totaling $8,730. Based on these
findings, the trial court entered judgment for Potter,
concluding that no accord and satisfaction existed and
that the Dishingers were in unlawful detainer because
the amount Potter received and accepted each month
was less than what the jury subsequently determined to
be the rental rate.
[10] 1f30 Although it could be argued that the
special verdict supports inconsistent legal theories
(accord and satisfaction and unlawful detainer), the
inconsistency is not fatal. The juiy was instructed to
answer all factual questions on all legal theories
presented in the special verdict. While the jury's
findings support inconsistent legal claims, a court is not
precluded, under Rule 49(a), from applying the law to
those findings and entering judgment for a party on one
theory, as a matter of law, which precludes judgment
on another inconsistent legal theor SeiMilligan v.
Capitol Furniture Co. 8 Utah 2d 383, 387, 335 P.2d
619, 622 (1959) (holding inconsistent special verdict
answers immaterial under Utah R. Civ. P. 49(a see
also Tsudek v. Target Stores, Inc 414 N.W.2d 466,
469-70 (Minn.Ct.App,1987) (finding inconsistent
special verdict answers reconcilable where jury was
simply answering all questions submitted based on the
evidence) Thus, as was the case here, if the special
verdict findings support, as a matter of law, an accord
and satisfaction then there cannot be an unlawful
detainer.

C. Effect of Lease Provision
**7 [111(31 Potter responds that even if the
jury's special verdict findings support an accord and
satisfaction, the lease itself precludes an accord and
satisfaction. Potter relies on the "Waiver" provision of
the lease which states:
The waiver by Landlord of any term, covenant or
condition herein contained shall not be deemed to
be a waiver of such terms, covenant or condition or
any subsequent breach of the same or any other
term, covenant or condition herein containec The
subsequent acceptance of rent hereunder by
Landlord shall not be deemed to be a waiver of
any preceding default by Tenant of any term,
covenant or condition of this Lease, other than the
failure of Tenant to pay particular rent also
accepted, regardless of Landlord's knowledge of
such preceding default at the time of the acceptance
of such rent
(Emphasis added.) Potter asserts that under this
lease provision, "acceptance of partial rent could not
constitute an accord and satisfaction."
If 32 Though not perfectly drafted, the boilerplate
language of this "Waiver" provision is not ambiguous.
The relevant portion, emphasized above, provides that
if the Dishingers default on any term, covenant, or
condition of the lease, and thereafter tender a rental
payment to Potter, and Potter accepts, by accepting,
Potter has not waived the prior defaults. For example,
if the Dishingers install exterior lighting as prohibited
by the lease, the installation, if not cured within thirty
days of notice, is a default.
If, thereafter, the
Dishingers send Potter a rent check which Potter
accepts, Potter has not waived the Dishinger's default
for the installation. However, if the Dishinger's default
for failure to pay rent, and thereafter tender a rental
payment to Potter, which Potter accepts, Potter thereby
waives the Dishinger's default for failure to pay rent.
U 33 What the lease provision does not provide, is
that acceptance of partial rent does not constitute an
accord and satisfaction. In fact, the term "accord and
satisfaction" is conspicuously absent from the face of
the lease, and beyond the "Waiver" provision, Potter
fails to point to any language in the lease that would
support her strained construction. Additionally, and
perhaps more importantly, Potter cannot claim that the
initial check tendered by the Dishingers was "partial
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paid in full. Tenant further agrees to pay any
attorney's fees [sic] incurred by Landlord by reason
of Tenant's failure to pay rent and/or other charges
when due hereunder.

rent," when there was never an agreement as to what
would actually be the rental rate. While hindsight
suggests that Potter should have provided for such a
situation in the lease, we cannot write such a provision
into the lease for h Se Jones v. ERA Brokers
Console 2000 UT 6\\ 18, 6 P.3d 1129 see alscRio
Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah
1980); Provo City Corp. v. Nielsen Scott Co., 603 P.2d
803,806 (Utah 1979). Thus, Potter's argument that the
lease prohibits an accord and satisfaction is not
supported by the lease itself.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, Potter was only entitled
to late fees and attorney fees under this provision if the
Dishingers failed to pay rent. Because we conclude
there was an accord and satisfaction, the Dishingers
were current on their rent payments and therefore
Potter was not entitled to late fees. (FN9)

Tl 34 In sum, the jury's special verdict established as
a matter of law an accord and satisfaction. The trial
court erred in not entering a judgment on the rental rate
for the option period in favor of the Dishingers. We
therefore reverse the trial court's judgment of unlawful
detainer and remand for the entry of a judgment for the
Dishingers based on the legal theory of accord and
satisfaction setting the rental rate at $19 per square
foot. (FN7)

[14] Tf 38 The trial court determined that Potter was
not entitled to attorney fees because the lease provided
that the "prevailing party shall be entitled to recover"
its attorney fees, and while Potter prevailed on her
counter-claim, the Dishingers prevailed on their claims
for an accounting and credit for overcharges of
common area expenses.
Thus, the trial court
determined neither party should be awarded attorney
fees because both prevailed.

III. Administrative, Late, and Attorney Fees
**8 [12] ^f 35 Potter argues that the lease provides
that the Dishingers shall pay administrative, late, and
attorney fees.
Potter submitted her claims for
administrative and late fees to the jury. In its special
verdict, the juiy found that, in addition to what the
Dishingers had already paid to Potter, Potter was only
entitled to the "Balance of base rent." Based on this
finding, the trial court determined that Potter was not
entitled to administrative and late fees. However, this
was properly a legal not a factual determination. The
lease is clear and unambiguous that Potter was entitled
to administrative fees. The lease states in no uncertain
terms that the tenant shall pay for all costs and fees
associated with supervising and administering to the
common areas. (FN8)
U 36 The Dishingers respond that Potter's argument
for administrative fees was not presented below.
However, the trial court clearly ruled on the issue based
on the jury's special verdict findings. Thus, Potter's
claim for administrative fees was presented below.
Therefore, we reverse and remand to the trial court for
an award of Potter's administrative fees.
[13] ^f 37 The lease further provides
Tenant shall pay to Landlord late charg< of ten
($10.00) dollars per day until the amount due is

^f 39 Because we conclude that there was an accord
and satisfaction and thus no unlawful detainer, the
"prevailing party" issue as to attorney fees should be
reconsidered by the trial court on remand. Therefore,
pursuant to the terms of the lease, Potter is entitled to
her administrative fees, and we remand to have the trial
court determine if either party should be awarded
attorney fees as the "prevailing party" under the lease.
CONCLUSION
Tj 40 We conclude, based on the jury's special
verdict, an accord and satisfaction occurred as a matter
of law fixing the "then prevailing rental rate" for the
option period of the lease at $19 per square foot in base
monthly rent. Therefore, because the Dishingers were
in lawful possession of the premises, we reverse the
trial court's legal determination of unlawful detainer
and its award of treble damages. We further conclude
that under the terms of the lease, Potter was entitled to
her administrative fees and remand for the trial court to
determine if either party is entitled to attorney fees as
the "prevailing party" under the lease.
141 I CONCUR: WILLIAM A. THORNE, Jr.,
Judge.
ORME, Judge (dissenting):
**9 142 I cannot agree there was an accord and
satisfaction in this case. While there was a bona fide
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dispute over the new rental rate and the Dishingers may
well have tendered their payments with the thought it
was in Ml satisfaction of what was due, there is no
finding that Pott acceptex the payments in full
satisfaction nor any basis in the evidence to conclude
that she did so. On the contrary, the Dishingers and
Potter had exchanged letters indicating very different
views of what constituted the "then prevailing rental
rate." Nothing suggests either side thereafter acceded
to the view of the other or that they reached a
compromise. On the contrary, within days of accepting
the Dishingers' check, Potter sent the Dishingers a
default notice stating what she believed the shortfall to
be. A couple of weeks later, the Dishingers filed their
declaratory judgment action acknowledging there was a
dispute between the parties and asking the court to
resolve it-not claiming there had been a dispute
between the parties that had been resolved by accord
and satisfaction and asking the court to enforce the
accord.
Tl 43 Applicable law does not require anything
inconsistent with the expectations of the parties, as
shown by their conduct. The "New Base Rent"
notation, apparently made in the "For
" space
on the front of the check, clearly does not satisfy the
UCC's requirement that "the instrument or an
accompanying written communication containf ] a
conspicuous statement to the effect that the instrument
was tendered &full satisfactiof of the claim." Utah
Code Ann § 70A-3-311(2) (1997) (emphasis added).
In addition, cases relied on by the majority are
inapposite. In both Marfan Remodeling v. Jensen, 706
P.2d 607 (Utah 1985), an Cove View Excavating &
Construction Co. v. Fly 758 P.2d 474 (Utah
Ct.App.1988), unlike in this case, the checks
evidencing the accord and satisfaction contained actual
restrictive endorsement provisio
IMarton
Remodeling, 706 P.2d at 608 ("Endorsement hereof
constitutes full and final satisfaction of any and all
claims...."); Cove Vie 758 P.2d at 476 (check
contained "pmt. in full" language on front of check and
this restrictive endorsement language on back of check:
"payment in full for all labor and materials to 6/26/84").
In Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc.
v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Ct 844
P.2d 322 (Utah 1992), a detailed letter made it clear
that the check could be accepted only as full payment.
See id. at 324-25.
^f 44 As a matter of law, the facts in this case do not
establish an accord and satisfaction.
The jury

recognized this and went on to find that the prevailing
rental rate was $25 per square foot and that the
Dishingers owed this to Potter under their contract.
Does this mean the Dishingers unlawfully detained the
premises, subjecting them to treble damages? It does
not. Potter, in her "notice to pay rent or quit,"
demanded payment of a sum well in excess of what she
was entitled to contractually. The jury found the
prevailing rate was $25, but she had demanded
payment of $30. The invalid demand renders the notice
completely ineffective to place the Dishingers in a state
of unlawful detainer.
**10. *| 45 When the dust settles in this case, the
proper result emerges with reasonable clarity. The
Dishingers did not owe as much as Potter thought they
did, but they owed more than they thought they did.
There was no accord and satisfaction, so they are liable
for the shortage. On the other hand, Potter had no right
to demand payment of an amount to which she was not
entitled, so she may not have the lesser amount to
which she was actually entitled trebled, nor is she
entitled to any other relief specially available under the
unlawful detainer statute. Clearly, then, there is no
prevailing party here-each side won a little and lost a
little-so neither side is entitled to an award of attorney
fees.
\ 46 On remand, I would simply have the trial court
amend its judgment to reflect the foregoing.
(FN1.) From a review of the record it appears that the
Dishingers were paying $18.48 per square foot in
minimum monthly rent at the time they notified
Potter of their desire to exercise the option.
(FN2.) The Dishingers subtracted $160.19 from the
July 1, 1996 rental payment for remaining credits
and premature Consumer Price Index increases
occurring in 1994 and 1995.
(FN3.) The Dishinger's citations to the record
reference the jury's special verdict; the Dishinger's
motion for entry of judgment based on special
verdict; the Dishinger's memorandum in support of
motion for relief from judgment; and the
Dishinger's supplemental memorandum in support
of motion for relief from judgment. In all these
instances the issue of accord and satisfaction was
raised in the trial court
(FN4.) We note the issue of accord and satisfaction
was not raised in the pleadings. However, Rule
15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
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that issues not raised in the pleadings may be tried
by express or implied consent. See Utah R. Civ. P.
15(b). "If an issue is fully tried, a court may decide
the issue and deem the pleadings amended even if
the issue was not originally pleaded." Shinkoskey v.
Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 4J6 n. 2, 19 P.3d
1005 (citing Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1176
(Utah Ct.App.1995) (citation omitted)). "Whether
the pleadings may be deemed amended depends on
whether the opposing party had a fair opportunity to
[prepare and meet the issue]. Id (citing Colman
v. Colman, 743 P.2d782, 785 (Utah Ct.App.1987)
). It must be evident from the record that the issue
has been tried. See id. (citing Fisher, 907 P.2d at
1176).
A review of the record reveals that evidence
regarding the existence of an accord and
satisfaction was presented at trial, and the jury was
instructed on and made findings of fact that would
support an accord and satisfaction. Additionally,
the Dishingers argued accord and satisfaction in
their motion for entry of judgment based on special
verdict, which Potter had the opportunity to rebut
and the trial court entered judgment finding there
was no accord and satisfaction. Thus, because
Potter had the opportunity to prepare and meet the
issue, we conclude that the issue of an accord and
satisfaction was tried by implication.
(FN5.) Although neither party has addressed this issue
in their briefs, we note at the outset that the option
provision in the lease is most likely unenforceable
in Utah. It is a well-recognized principle that, "A
condition precedent to the enforcement of any
contract is that there be meeting of the mind of
the parties, which must be spelled out, either
expressly or implicitly, with sufficient definiteness
to be enforced.' Pingree v. Continental Group of
Utah, Inc. 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). Pingree,
the Utah Supreme Court stated,
"a provision for the extension or renewal of a lease
must specify the time the lease is to extend and the
rate to be paid with such a degree of certainty and
definiteness that nothing is left to future
determination. If it falls short of this requirement, it
is not enforceable."
Id. at 1321 (quoting Slayterv. Pasley, 199 Or. 616,
264 P.2d 444,446 (Or. 1953)).

In the instant case, the lease provided that the rental
rate for the renewal period would be "the then
prevailing rental rate of similar buildings in the
Main Street area of Park City." On July 1, 1996,
the commencement of the renewal period, the
parties had yet to agree on what constituted "the
then prevailing rental rate of similar buildings in the
Main Street area of Park City." Both parties had
communicated to the other a vastly different rate
and interpretation, and the Dishingers filed a
declaratory judgment action asking the trial court to
interpret the provision. Thus, it cannot be said that
the rate provided for in the option provision of the
lease possesses the certainty and definiteness
required to be enforced. In sum, there was no
meeting of the minds, and as a result, no agreement.
Therefore, the lease terminated by its own terms as
of July 1, 1996. However, because we conclude
that an accord and satisfaction occurred, the
unenforceability of the option provision does not
affect our analysis.
**10_ (FN6.) In response, Potter attempts to rely on
language froi Tates, Inc. v. Little America
Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1975), wherein
our supreme court stated, "Ordinarily, the payment
of part of a debt does not discharge it.... The reason
for this is that in making the part payment, the
debtor is doing nothing more than he is legally
obligated to dc 1 at 1229. This general
statement is true, to the extent that there is no
"dispute or uncertainty as to the amount due." Id. at
1229-30. In the instant case it is well established
that there is a dispute as to the amount due.
(FN7.) Because we conclude there was an accord and
satisfaction and thereby reverse the trial court's
legal conclusion that the Dishingers were in
unlawful detainer, we do not address the
Dishinger's alternative argument of waiver and
Potter's cross-appeal regarding the definition of the
term "prevailing rate."
(FN8.) Specifically, the lease states that the tenant
shall pay
All costs to supervise and administer said common
areas, used in common by the tenants or occupants
of the building. [S]aid costs shall include such fees
as may be paid to a third party in connection with
same and shall in any event include a fee to
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Landlord to supervise and administer same in an
amount equal to ten (10%) of the total costs of (i)
above.
(FN9.) Potter does not argue she was entitled to
attorney fees under this provision.
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